inss.ndu.edu SF No. 295 1
T
he strategic import of U.S.-Cuba relations was underscored by Presi-
dent Barack Obama’s historic visit to Cuba from March 20–22, 2016,
and his comment that he had come to Cuba “to bury the last remnant
of the Cold War in the Americas.” Geography also reinforces the strategic im-
portance of both countries to one another. Cuba sits astride the intersection
of the three large bodies of water dominating the approaches to the southern
United States. e large island nation is in a position to block, complicate, or
facilitate U.S. border control eorts in many ways. Partnering with Cuba also
might allow the United States to benet from Cuba’s notable record of using
soft power eectively in the Western Hemisphere and beyond.
But the reasons that Cuba needs good relations with its powerful and tech-
nologically advanced neighbor are even more evident. Besides its attractiveness
as a trade partner, the United States has nancial, military, logistical, medical
research, and development capabilities; permanent physical presence; and strate-
gic reach well beyond those of any other nation or even group of nations. Good
relations with the United States would free up Cuban resources for economic
development that have long been devoted to security preparedness.
e natural and perhaps mandatory place to broaden U.S.-Cuba rapproche-
ment is to build on small military-to-military cooperation arrangements already
in place. e Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias,
or FAR) of Cuba are the central institution of the state and far more capable
and prestigious than Cuba’s Communist Party. e FAR are loyal, proud of their
performance in the survival of the revolution, and reform-minded, believing that
their own exibility and penchant for reform have played a pivotal role in that
survival. Its senior ranks are men personally chosen by Raúl Castro over several
decades who share their leader’s sense of urgency about the need for reform. ey
Reections on U.S.-Cuba
Military-to-Military Contacts
by Hal Klepak
STRATEGIC FORUM
National Defense University
About the Author
Dr. Hal Klepak is Professor Emeritus
of History and Strategy at the Royal
Military College of Canada. He is an
Advisor on Inter-American Security
Issues. He is the author of
Cuba’s
Military 1990–2005: Revolutionary
Soldiers During Counter-Revolutionary
Times
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
Key Points
President Barack Obama’s visit to
Cuba in March 2016 opened up the
possibility of strategic benets for
both nations. Well after over 50
years of hostility, however, it will
not be easy to keep this nascent
relationship on track.
Avoiding missteps requires a deep
knowledge of Cuba and particularly
its Revolutionary Armed Forces
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias,
or FAR). The FAR are a complex and
powerful institution that enjoys
great public respect—more so than
Cuba’s Communist Party—and
remain central to the function-
ing of the Cuban economy and
state. Broadening rapprochement
without the support of the FAR is
inconceivable.
To build on the historic opening
in diplomatic relations, both sides
need a better appreciation of the
other’s institutional norms and
some clear “rules of the road” to
guide the relationship.
This paper offers insights concern-
ing the FAR. It argues that it will be
important to expand cooperation
in the right areas and that it will be
important to start small, go slow,
build trust, consult early and often,
let Cuba take the lead, and avoid
imposing or reecting a U.S.-centric
view of civil-military relations.
July 2016
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH
