Holistic Target Development Christopher Perry – AO1
Capt Christopher Perry/JFHQ-C AF/C-TOC/cjp/16 APR 19
The United States (US) Department of Defense’s (DOD) Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms (2018) framed joint doctrine as enhancing “… the operational effectiveness of
the Armed Forces by providing authoritative guidance and standardized terminology on topics
relevant to the employment of military forces” (p. 1). Thus, in order to be victorious, whereby
executing the principles of joint operations under the seven tenets of airpower, we must operate
in joint doctrine. Furthermore, according to the Department of the Air Force (AF) (2015), when
applied properly, it can provide “… a 70-, 80-, or even 90-percent solution to most questions,
allowing leaders to focus on the remainder, which usually involves tailoring for the specific
mission” (p. 10). To achieve the end-state as articulated by our national command authority, we
must do so through the application of effects on specific tasks versus platforms (US AF, 2015, p.
14). Within this framework, the problem we face in achieving our mission success, is we
collectively must do so under the constraints of our available resources. These available
resources are specifically manpower and equipment. Therefore, how do we ascertain the
necessary resources to accomplish our mission?
Currently, the Air Force supports six geographic and four functional commands with an
estimated 325,000 active duty Airmen, each with varying operational objectives to achieve, but
all hold one element of a process in common--the Joint Targeting Cycle in Joint Publication 3-60
(US AF, 2018). Defined within AF doctrine, “Targeting helps translate strategy into discrete
actions against targets by linking ends, ways, means, and risks. It is a central component of Air
Force operational art and design in the application of airpower to create lethal and nonlethal
effects” (US AF, 2017, p. 3). Critical to achieving the desired end-state is the identification of
critical elements of a target to include both the physical as well as non-kinetic vulnerable
characterizations (US DOD, 2016, p. D-B-5 and US AF, 2017, p. 60). In the domains of our AF,
