https://crsreports.congress.gov
Updated April 5, 2022
National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G)
Mobile Technologies
The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will
increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth
over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn
enabling new military and commercial applications. 5G
technologies are expected to support interconnected or
autonomous devices, such as smart homes, self-driving
vehicles, precision agriculture systems, industrial
machinery, and advanced robotics. 5G for the military
could additionally improve intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems and processing; enable new
methods of command and control (C2); and streamline
logistics systems for increased efficiency, among other
uses. As 5G technologies are developed and deployed,
Congress may consider policies for spectrum management
and national security, as well as implications for U.S.
military operations.
Spectrum Management
5G technologies plan to use three segments of the
electromagnetic spectrum (“the spectrum”): high band (also
called millimeter wave, or MMW), which operates between
around 24 and 300 GHz; mid band, which operates between
1 GHz and 6 GHz; and low band, which operates below 1
GHz. Mid band and low band are often collectively referred
to as sub-6 (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. 5G Proposed Spectrum
Source: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/03/2002109302/-1/-1/0/
DIB_5G_STUDY_04.03.19.PDF.
Millimeter waves allow faster data transfer rates, which
some telecommunications companies argue is required for
autonomous vehicles, virtual reality, and other data-
intensive applications like smart cities; however, MMW
travel comparatively short distances and can be absorbed by
rain or disrupted by physical objects such as buildings and
vehicles. As a result, 5G MMW technologies require
installing a higher number of cell sites—at much higher
cost and on a much slower deployment timeline than the
sub-6 approach. 5G deployment thus relies on MMW for
high-speed, high-bandwidth communications and on sub-6
waves for nationwide coverage.
Telecommunication companies around the world are
deploying 5G in different ways. Chinese
telecommunications companies are focusing on the less
expensive sub-6 approach, while some U.S.
telecommunication providers are focused on MMW
deployments and others on sub-6.
The Department of Defense (DOD), however, holds large
portions of the usable spectrum. Although DOD uses
certain MMW frequencies for high-profile military
applications such as Advanced Extremely High Frequency
satellites that provide assured global communications for
U.S. forces, it extensively uses sub-6 frequencies—leaving
less sub-6 availability in the United States than in other
countries. The Defense Innovation Board (DIB) advised
DOD to consider sharing sub-6 spectrum to facilitate the
build-out of 5G networks and the development of 5G
technologies used in the sub-6 band. While DOD has been
moving toward greater spectrum sharing, it has expressed
concern that sharing presents operational, interference, and
security issues for DOD users. As an alternative to
spectrum sharing, some analysts have argued that portions
of the sub-6 spectrum should be reserved for commercial
use. This would require DOD to relocate certain
applications to other parts of the spectrum. The DIB
estimates this approach would take around 10 years to
complete, as opposed to 5 years for spectrum sharing.
National Security Concerns
According to a DIB assessment, China is the current leader
in sub-6 technologies and is likely to deploy the world’s
first 5G wide-area network. Chinese companies, which
often receive government subsidies (e.g., subsidized land
for facilities, R&D grants), are therefore well-positioned as
global 5G suppliers. Huawei has signed contracts for the
construction of 5G infrastructure in around 30 countries,
including Iceland, Turkey, and Hungary.
Some experts are concerned that vulnerabilities in Chinese
equipment could be used to conduct cyberattacks or
military/industrial espionage. These experts claim
vulnerabilities were introduced through the poor business
practices of many Chinese companies. However, they note
that vulnerabilities could also be intentionally introduced
for malicious purposes. China’s National Intelligence Law,
enacted in June 2017, declares that “any organization and
citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide
assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and
guard the secrecy of any national intelligence work that
they are aware of.” Some analysts interpret this law as
requiring Chinese companies to cooperate with intelligence
services, including compelling installation of backdoors to
provide private data to the government.
