Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited
Fusing Data into a Battle Damage Assessment for the
Commander
Lead Analyst
MAJ Cohen, Jared B.
Contributing Analyst
CW3 Ryker, Joshua
Aug 2022
DISCLAIMER: Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) presents professional
information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department
of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army
position and does not change or supersede any information in other official U.S. Army
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material they provide.
Vignette
It was a rainy Sunday morning during the Corps Warfighter Exercise (WFX). After 72
hours of deliberate targeting against the enemy, the Commanding General (CG) asked
his staff during the Targeting Decision Board (TDB) if the Corps had set conditions for the
divisions to conduct their wet gap crossing (WGX). The Corps Commander looked at the
G-2 for an assessment. The G-2 Targeting Officer (G-2T) and Fire Support Coordinator
(FSCOORD) briefed the overall strength of the enemy and assessed combat systems
removed from the battlefield, but they did not provide an assessment of targeting’s overall
effects on the enemy’s ability to affect the WGX. Based on the number of combat systems
removed from the battlefield, the CG ordered the division to begin the WGX.
At 0400, the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) ordered the Multi-Role Bridge
Company (MRBC) from the Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) to bridge two 107-meter
gaps across the river to enable the division’s crossing. The MRBC immediately received
indirect fire from enemy 9A52s and 2S19s belonging to the 20th Integrated Fires
Command (IFC), causing heavy casualties and destroying the bridging assets.
Additionally, 2S6M ADA systems protecting enemy defenses near the WGX destroyed
six AH-64 Apache helicopters supporting 1 ABCT. The Corps Deputy Commanding
General for Maneuver (DCG-M), who controlled the fight from the Tactical Command Post
(TAC), ordered 1
ABCT to cease crossing operations and to establish a hasty defense
while the division attempted to destroy the enemy ADA and artillery affecting the WGX.
The DCG-M looked at the G-2 and G-3 for an update. He asked why 1 ABCT and the
CAB received such heavy casualties from enemy artillery and ADA when the staff briefed
all 9A52s and 2S6Ms supporting defenses near the WGX were destroyed.
After re-evaluating the BDA provided to the Commander, the G-2 realized that several
factors led to an inaccurate assessment regarding enemy composition, disposition, and
capability with respect to the WGX. First, the G-2T incorrectly assessed the number of
combat systems removed from the battlefield. He did not account for decoys on the
