74 September-October 2010 MILITARY REVIEW
Commander John T. Kuehn, Ph.D.,
U.S. Navy, Retired, is an associate
professor of military history at the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff
College and the curriculum developer
for the CGSC Department of Military
History. He received a B.A. from Miami
University of Ohio, an MMAS from
the U.S. Army School of Advanced
Military Studies, and a Ph.D. from
Kansas State University. He served as
a naval ight ofcer in the U.S. Navy
from 1981 to 2004.
_____________
ART: China, Ming Dynasty, era (1368-
1644) Imperial Cavalry Guards
At the strategic level, the campaign replaces the engagement, and the
theater of operations takes the place of the position. At the next stage, the
war as a whole replaces the campaign, and the whole country the theater
of operations.
—Carl von Clausewitz
L
ATELY THERE HAS been a great deal of editorializing, sermonizing
even, on the topic of the grand strategy of the United States. A consen-
sus has emerged that the United States has no grand strategy. At one end of
the spectrum of opinion, we have Andrew Bacevich of Boston University
claiming, “There is no czar for strategy. This most crucial portfolio remains
unassigned.” From the other end of the spectrum the ubiquitous Ralph Peters
writes, “Pause to consider how lockstep what passes for analysis in Wash-
ington has become.” Both men are referring to the U.S. strategy—or lack
of it—in Afghanistan.
1
In August 2009, on the opening day of the new class
at the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), retired Marine
Corps General Anthony Zinni implied that the kind of “reordering” that
took place after World War II under President Truman and retired General
George C. Marshall has not taken place since. I submit that when General
Zinni said “reordering,” he meant “grand strategy.”
2
The implications of this
view are troubling. How could a global hegemon like the United States lack
the sine qua non of a coherent national security strategy?
In order to have a useful discussion on this topic we must dene our terms.
First, the intermediate service colleges do not uniformly teach the concept of
grand strategy. The Command and General Staff College does not teach grand
strategy as a separate level of war to eld grade ofcers, and the Army’s cap-
stone operational doctrine Field Manual 3-0, Operations, does not mention it
once. To be fair, some instructors at CGSC do teach the concept—but on their
own initiative. On the other hand, the Naval War College exposes students to
the concept early and often in its curriculum.
3
Perhaps Clausewitz’s On War
best denes grand strategy: “At the strategic level, the campaign replaces the
engagement, and the theater of operations takes the place of the position. At the
next stage, the war as a whole replaces the campaign, and the whole country
the theater of operations.” In other words, grand strategy is “the next stage,”
Commander John T. Kuehn, Ph.D., U.S. Navy, Retired
Talking
Grand
Strategy
