Defense
Until the problem of slow Army deployment rates is solved, the
world’s best military runs the risk of performing poorly or failing to
achieve national political objectives in future crises. Recognizing
that the U.S. military cannot wait a decade or longer to produce new
technologies that still may not solve the rapid deployment problem,
the Army Transformation Roadmap 2003 states that the goal of
transformation is to "identify and build required capabilities
now . . . while developing future force capabilities essential to pro-
vide relevant, ready, responsive, and dominant land power to the
Future Joint Force."
1
Indeed, one aspect of Army transformation
efforts is force redesign to develop an active component capable of
deploying a responsive, agile expeditionary force in the first fifteen
days of an operation.
2
Much of the tonnage now devoted to Army assets must be
shipped by sea, because the capacity of U.S. strategic airlift is insuf-
ficient. Consider that each cargo ship must be individually loaded at
ports in the continental United States, sailed thousands of miles, and
offloaded at foreign ports. Loading and offloading a single cargo ship
alone can take two or three days. Shortage of cargo ships, poor
offloading facilities at foreign ports, and other problems can create
bottlenecks that considerably delay shipments. This reliance on
slow-moving cargo ships to transport weighty forces lies at the heart
of the Army deployment problem.
How the Army achieves its transformational goal of rapid
deployment depends on its perspective on weight. That is, transfor-
mation plans differ if the objective is weight reduction as opposed to
weight redistribution. Weight reduction is primarily platform-centric
and relies on technological advances in materials and network tech-
nology to deliver a single lightweight platform capable of surviving
heavy combat. Weight redistribution considers parameters other
than platform weight and the ability to distribute information in net-
works to meet Army goals; forces are re-structured into small, mod-
ular units, pre-positioned across the globe, and deployed in a time-
sequential manner. Although the second approach is less dependent
on technology, it is possible only if Army forces are considered mal-
leable in time, space, and structure.
Overview
Army transformation is an attempt to provide future forces with
enhanced capabilities in lethality, survivability, and mobility,
both strategic and tactical. Alternatives to achieving these goals
differ in emphasis on weight and reliance on technology. That is,
transformation plans differ if the objective is weight reduction as
opposed to weight redistribution. In one approach, platform
weight is reduced to meet mobility goals. However, shedding
weight has implications for platform survivability and lethality;
previous attempts to design a single platform that is simultane-
ously lethal, mobile, and survivable have not done so satisfacto-
rily. Thus, advances in materials are required to insure the sur-
vivability of a lightweight platform. Advances in network
technology are also required to make the platform more aware of
its environment. The immaturity of these technologies increases
the risks inherent in transformation based strictly on platform
characteristics.
In contrast, weight redistribution considers parameters
other than platform weight and networks to meet Army goals.
Indeed, due to the weight of support assets, replacing all com-
bat platforms with 20-ton vehicles reduces only marginally the
overall weight of a division and corps. An alternative approach
to transformation restructures Army forces into small, modular
units, pre-positioned across the globe, and deployed in a time-
sequential manner. This approach, with its reduced dependency
on technology, is a practical near-term alternative and should
be pursued in parallel with technology development.
While many lessons remain to be learned from Operation Iraqi
Freedom, two already are firm and clear: air power is not a cure-all,
and large, well-armed ground forces are still needed for expedi-
tionary warfare. However, heavy Army forces that were so important
to success in this war still lack the capacity to deploy overseas
swiftly enough.
Alternative Approaches to Army
Transformation
by Joseph N. Mait and Richard L. Kugler
A publication of the
Center for Technology and National Security Policy
National Defense University
JULY 2004
Number 41
Horizons
July 2004 Defense Horizons 1
201-345_DH41.qxd 7/13/04 1:17 PM Page 1
