1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 26, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, Nicole
Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 26, 9 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces launched another massive series of missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on
January 26. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valery Zaluzhnyi stated that Russian forces launched 55
air- and sea-based missiles, including Kh-101, Kh-555, Kh-47, and Kh-95 Kalibr and Kinzhal missiles at Ukraine
from Tu-95, Su-35, and MiG-31K aircraft from the waters of the Black Sea.
Ukrainian air defense shot down 47
of the 55 missiles and all 24 Shahed 136 and 131 drones.
Several missiles struck critical infrastructure in
Vinnytsia and Odesa oblasts.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov notably reported that Russian forces
had 90 Iranian-made drones remaining as of January 7.
Russian forces have enough drones for only a few more
large-scale strikes unless they have received or will soon receive a new shipment of drones from Iran. Russian
Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran on January 23 to
expand bilateral cooperation efforts, conversations that may have included discussions on the provision of
Iranian-made weapons systems to Russia.
A recent altercation between Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and former Russian
officer Igor Girkin is exposing a new domain for competition among Russian nationalist groups
for political influence in Russia. Girkin accused Prigozhin on January 25 of deliberately misconstruing his
criticism of Prigozhin’s political aspirations and exploitation of the information space as an attack on Wagner
forces fighting in Ukraine.
Girkin claimed that Wagner-affiliated outlet RiaFan’s interview with an unnamed
Wagner commander who blamed Girkin for abandoning positions in Donbas in 2014 was an effort to
anonymously discredit him.
Girkin also accused Prigozhin of continuing to commit Wagner forces to support
operations in Syria and African countries instead of deploying his mercenaries to win the war in Ukraine.
Prigozhin replied that he does not have political ambitions and stated that his team attempted to bribe Girkin in
an effort to silence his criticism of Wagner forces that could have led to the imprisonment of his fighters for
illegal mercenary activity.
Prigozhin also made a point of exaggerating his authority by claiming that he cannot
withdraw Wagner from Africa because he “made a promise to several presidents” that he will “defend them,”
claimed that Wagner “de-facto” won the Syrian war, and noted that Wagner was kicked out of Donbas in 2015.
Prigozhin reiterated that he founded, controls, and sponsors Wagner and sarcastically invited Girkin to join one
of Wagner’s assault units in occupied Luhansk Oblast, which Girkin stated he would do if Prigozhin sent him a
serious invitation.
Prigozhin further demeaned Girkin by stating that Wagner does not send out invitations and
stated that Girkin would not be effective on the frontlines because he is only interested in promoting himself for
financial benefit.
Prigozhin and Girkin – both critics of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s conduct of the war –
are likely competing for influence and patronage among pro-war politicians disillusioned with
the progress of the war. ISW assessed on October 4 that the Russian nationalists are split among three
distinct groups that pursue different objectives while unilaterally criticizing the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD): Russian or proxy veterans, nationalists with their own private forces, and Russian milbloggers and war
correspondents.
Girkin represents the veteran faction due to his connections with veteran organizations such
as the All-Russian Officers Assembly, while Prigozhin is a self-proclaimed nationalist with access to a parallel
military structure.
While both have avidly denied their political aspirations in Russia, they have continued to
criticize the Russian MoD and the Kremlin in an effort to boost their prominence in Russian society against the
