1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 1, 2023
Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W.
Kagan
May 1, 2023, 5pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These
maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic
frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike against Ukraine on the night of April 30 to May
1. Ukrainian sources reported that nine Tu-95 and two Tu-160 strategic bombers took off from Murmansk Oblast and near
the Caspian Sea and launched 18 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles at Ukraine.[1] Ukrainian air defense shot down 15 of the
missiles.[2] Geolocated footage from Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, shows that one of the missiles struck the Pavlohrad
Chemical Plant and caused a massive explosion on impact.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 1
that the strikes targeted Ukrainian military-industrial objects and successfully disrupted the production of military
resources.[4] The Russian MoD has recently shifted its rhetoric and is actively describing strike campaigns, likely in an effort
to portray a proactive approach to growing concerns in the Russian information space regarding a Ukrainian
counteroffensive. Russian milbloggers claimed that the missiles struck Ukrainian air defense systems and a transportation
hub in Pavlohrad.[5] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat noted that the fact that both the Tu-95 and Tu-160s
carried far fewer missiles than their maximum load suggests that Russia continues to struggle with adequate production of
such munitions.[6]
The White House assessed on May 1 that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 causalities—80,000
wounded and 20,000 killed—in fighting for Bakhmut since January 2023.[7] US National Security Council
Spokesperson John Kirby announced that half of the 20,000 killed in action were Wagner Group fighters. Kirby also
assessed that Russia’s offensive on Bakhmut has failed.[8]
Ukrainian officials continue to signal Ukraine’s readiness for potential counteroffensive
operations. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated on May 1 that Ukraine is “reaching the finish line” in
terms of when it will be ready to launch counteroffensive actions.[9] Reznikov noted that the ratio of available ammunition
still does not favor Ukraine but stated that Russian capabilities continue to be limited.[10] Ukrainian Main Intelligence
Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov emphasized on April 30 that the main goal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive
remains the liberation of all Ukrainian territory and stated that he hopes Ukraine will be able to improve its positions along
the entire frontline in order to effectively threaten Russian logistics in occupied Crimea and Donbas.[11]
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely using his rehabilitated standing with Russian
leadership to amplify his self-promotion efforts and his longstanding issues with the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD). Russian sources began circulating an alleged letter from the MoD to Prigozhin on April 30 responding to
Prigozhin's Apil 29 interview wherein he threatened to withdraw Wagner forces from Bakhmut if the Russian military fails
to provide more ammunition to Wagner.[12] The letter, dated April 23, lists all the artillery ammunition and equipment that
the Russian MoD provides to Wagner.[13] A Russian official may have released the letter to stop Prigozhin from using the
issue of artillery shortages to criticize the MoD as he has done in the past.[14] Prigozhin responded by stating that the figures
provided by the unverified document are still not sufficient for what Wagner needs to complete its assigned
tasks.[15] Prigozhin then claimed on May 1 that Wagner is in possession of large stocks of weapons it captured from
Ukrainian forces during the seizure of Soledar in January 2023, and Prigozhin rhetorically boasted that he has enough arms
to support a million-strong army.[16] Prigozhin suggested that he would offer to exchange these stocks of weapons for the
resources that Wagner requires.[17] Prigozhin will likely continue to rely on his existing informational lines of attack to
promote himself and seek further privileges from the Russian military as he retains a rehabilitated standing with Russian
leadership.[18]
The Russian MoD confirmed on April 30 the replacement of Russian Deputy Minister of Defense for
Logistics Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev with Colonel General Aleksey Kuzmenkov. The MoD provided
no justification for the replacement nor did it specify whether Mizintsev has a new role. Russian milbloggers began
speculating about the replacement of Mizintsev with Kuzmenkov, who was then Deputy Head of the Russian National Guard
(Rosgvardia), on April 27.[19] Regular changes to the Russian military command have resulted in increasingly factionalized
Russian military and disorganized command structures that degrade Russia’s military capability, as ISW has recently
assessed.[20]
