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SPECIAL REPORT 149 SEPTEMBER 2005
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
SPECIAL REPORT
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily
reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace,
which does not advocate specific policy positions.
CONTENTS
Introduction 2
The Strategic Military Setting 3
Geographic and Demographic Trends 3
Political Trends 7
International Legal and Economic Trends x
and Multilateral Involvement 9
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 11
ABOUT THE REPORT
The United States Institute of Peace’s Project on Arab-
Israeli Futures is a research effort designed to anticipate
and assess obstacles and opportunities facing the
peace process over the next five to ten years. Stepping
back from the day-to-day ebb and flow of events in
the Middle East, this project examines broader, “over-
the-horizon” developments that could foreclose future
options or offer new opportunities for peace. The effort
brings together U.S., Israeli, and Arab researchers and
is directed by Scott Lasensky of the Institute’s Research
and Studies program.
In this report, Yossi Alpher identifies which local,
regional, and international trends will have the greatest
impact on Israel’s relationship with Palestinians in the
coming years. Next in the series is Khalil Shikaki’s study
of long-term trends in Palestinian public opinion and
their policy implications for the peace process.
Yossi (Joseph) Alpher is currently coeditor of the
bitterlemons family of Internet-based Middle East
dialogue publications. He is a former director of the
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.
In 2000 Alpher served as a senior adviser to Israeli
prime minister Ehud Barak.
Yossi Alpher
The Future of the
Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict
Critical Trends Affecting Israel
Summary
• A broad fabric of anticipated developments and attitudes suggests only limited prog-
ress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace in the next few years.
• The elimination of the Iraqi armed forces in 2003 has minimized the danger of an all-
out conventional war between Israel and its eastern neighbors, reducing the strategic
value for Israel of the West Bank. At the same time, however, Israel is conscious of the
danger posed by a nuclear-armed Iran, a danger that might intimidate Israel’s neigh-
bors into taking a more aggressive stance toward Israel, exacerbating Arab-Israeli
relations and escalating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
• U.S.-supported democratization in the Middle East may reduce inter-Arab support for
the Palestinian cause but could also inspire Islamic movements, generating greater
Palestinian militancy and tougher negotiating positions.
• The collapse of Oslo, the failure of Camp David, and the ensuing four years of conflict
have undermined Israeli trust in a full-fledged peace process with the Palestinians.
In the near term, this attitude is unlikely to change because of Palestinian leadership
changes, however welcome they might be.
• Israel has opted to disengage unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank
rather than to seek to negotiate its withdrawal. Disengagement is motivated first
and foremost by a drive to ensure Israel’s survival as a Jewish and democratic state
rather than to reactivate the peace process. Most Israelis now support fencing off the
Palestinian territories and removing isolated settlements to protect themselves and to
avoid absorbing Palestinian Arabs.
• Israel’s Arab population is no longer seen as a “bridge to peace” with the West Bank
and Gazan Palestinian population but as yet another obstacle to achieving a two-state
solution.
