ARIANE M. TABATABAI, JEFFREY MARTINI, BECCA WASSER
The Iran Threat Network (ITN)
Four Models of Iran’s Nonstate
Client Partnerships
N
onstate clients became one of the key pillars of Iran’s national security strategy and its gray
zone activities following the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.
1
The regime
began to enlist foreign forces during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and, since then, its net-
work of proxies has grown exponentially. Today, Iran has tens of thousands of close allied
fighters over whom it exerts near-complete control, and tens of thousands more with which it has
real, but far more limited, ties and on whom it cannot rely in a crisis. Altogether, by some accounts,
the number of these forces is estimated at approximately 200,000 (Jones, 2019). These fighters com-
prise the Iran Threat Network (ITN), a loose network of non-Iranian, nonstate groups supported by
Tehran.
Members of the ITN are diverse in their origins, ethnic and religious backgrounds and affilia-
tion, status and influence within their countries, and relationship with Tehran. However, they are all
nonstate actors having received some
level of support from the Islamic
Republic—organizational, financial,
political, or military. Therefore, the
ITN encompasses Iranian proxies
and partners. The ITN is not simply
a hub-and-spoke system with Iran in
the center. Instead, different mem-
bers of the ITN also interact with
Lebanese Hizbullah (LH), Iran’s most
trusted and capable proxy, which is at
the forefront of many of these interac-
tions. Nevertheless, the ITN remains
a loose network supported by Iran.
C O R P O R A T I O N
KEY FINDINGS
Q The Iran Threat Network (ITN) is a formidable force of tens of thou-
sands of fighters. The ITN is Tehran’s most potent deterrent at its
disposal against the United States. The ITN is presently—and likely
to remain well into the future—Tehran’s primary means of power
projection and preferred instrument of influence in the Middle East.
Q ITN members—not Tehran—are most likely to launch attacks
against U.S. and other targets.
Q The ITN also poses a broader dilemma for the United States,
because rising U.S.-Iran tensions have required the United
States to increase its posture in the Middle East and decrease its
resources for other U.S. defense priorities.
Q It is important that the U.S. government adopt a multidimensional
approach to counter Iran’s use of the ITN to undermine U.S. inter-
ests or potentially harm U.S. military and civilian personnel.
Research Report
