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141. Memorandum of Discussion at the 284th Meeting of the National
Security Council, Washington, May 10, 1956
1
Washington , May 10, 1956
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]
3. U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments
Governor Stassen indicated that his report to the National Security Council on the recent disarmament
negotiations in London would be divided into three parts. The first would be retrospective, the second
would discuss where we now stood, and the third would include future areas of concentration of
disarmament activity.
In retrospect, one of the chief objectives of the U.S. delegation to the London meetings was to concert
our policies with the Anglo-French policies, so that the British and French delegations would not
o!cially table their own disarmament plan, many portions of which were unacceptable to the United
States. As a result of negotiations with the British and French, the latter not only modified their
disarmament plan, but agreed to put it forward as a working paper rather than as a fixed position of
their governments.
2
The next big problem was the issue of the relation of German reunification to disarmament. This
involved many consultations with the British and French, and Governor Stassen said that he had flown
to Paris to deal particularly with the French on this subject. As a result of many conversations, it was
finally agreed among the three Western powers that we would agree to commence a program for
reducing the level of U.S. forces down to 2,500,000 prior to an agreement with the Soviet Union on a
settlement of German reunification in freedom. However, it was the agreed position of the three
Western powers that we would not reduce our forces below this level until the German reunification
problem was solved along our lines. This agreement provided the basis for the four-power declaration
on the German problem.
3
The net result of these negotiations with the British and French
was that there was no divisive issue among the four Western powers—the United States, the United
Kingdom, France and Canada.
Governor Stassen then moved on to the second portion of his report—namely, where we were at the
present time. As for the Soviet position, Governor Stassen observed that, apart from the e"ort to divide
the four Western powers, the real Soviet position, when thoroughly probed, consisted of the following
three points: First, the Soviets were very firm indeed in opposing President Eisenhower’s Geneva plan
for aerial inspection and reconnaissance; the depth of their suspicion of this plan showed up very
clearly. Secondly, the Soviets were rigidly opposed to any tying-in of the issue of German reunification
and the reduction of armaments. Thirdly, the Soviets had made their most significant advance in our
direction when they came forward with a much more open, detailed and satisfactory program for
ground inspection. They had even agreed that this ground inspection system should be in place and
operative before any of the powers began to reduce the level of their forces. Parenthetically, Governor
Stassen declared that the U.S. delegation had made clear that if the Soviet Union could be prevailed upon
to make as great an advance in the matter of aerial inspection as they thus had on ground inspection,
there was real likelihood for progress in the control of armaments. Another significant advance in the
Soviet position as it currently stood was their abandonment of the “ban the bomb” prerequisite in their
disarmament program. Governor Stassen speculated that the Soviets at long last had realized that there
was absolutely no hope of ever inducing the United States to agree to an immediate and outright
banning of nuclear weapons.
Moving to the third portion of his report, Governor Stassen first indicated that when the United Nations
Disarmament Commission met again in the middle of June, the United States would be in pretty good
shape for the sessions.
