Research Report
KEY FINDINGS
Across the doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy
(DOTLPF-P) domains, the U.S. Army has, and follows, formal processes to make changes in each, and the
Army appears to use all these processes frequently.
a
Although the Army is currently making significant
changes to these processes, many aspects of its current approach appear to be successful. However, there
are issues to keep in mind when making changes in some domains, including the following:
■ Doctrine and policy are changed frequently, and these changes follow the guidelines for creation and
revision dictated by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), as well as U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) guidance and regulations. Primary mechanisms that help ensure success
are funding, prioritization, and comment resolution.
■ In the organization domain, any issues that arise throughout the process are typically related to disagree-
ments over prioritization or a failure to appropriately resource the organizational change.
■ In the leadership and education domain, the most significant hurdle is that changes typically require sub-
stantial lead times for development and implementation.
■ In the facilities domain, challenges can arise because changes often lag those made in the other
DOTLPF-P domains.
Our results converge on three factors that should be considered as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for
improving the likelihood of success of a solution or change:
b
■ Initial and continued senior-leader interest and support can enable the implementation and success of
a solution, particularly support from the Chief of Staff of the Army or Vice Chief of Staff of the Army for
cross-proponent cases. However, strategic objectives and operational demands can change a leader’s
priorities.
■ Rapid institutionalization allows for a solution to “hit the streets” relatively quickly and become part
of the broader Army (both organizationally and culturally).
c
Once adopted and employed, a change or
solution—especially if its utility is continually demonstrated—becomes more enduring.
■ Demonstrated operational utility provides a rationale for a solution or change to be resourced and
amended (as warranted) because it meets deployed-unit needs. If the operational environment changes,
the solution must continue to show both utility and adaptability, preferably across a range of environments
and under varying conditions.
SAMANTHA MCBIRNEY, BRYAN W. HALLMARK, STEPHEN WEBBER, ERIK E. MUELLER, ERIN N. LEIDY,
CAOLIONNO'CONNELL, DRAKE WARREN, SALE LILLY, ANDREA M. ABLER
A Review of U.S. Army Non-Materiel
Capability-Development Processes
ARROYO CENTER
a
This report focuses primarily on the quantity of changes, as opposed to quality. We never attempted to judge the quality of a
given solution; that level of analysis was beyond the scope of this project.
b
We did not define success as whether a program endured but instead whether it met its initial objectives. All successful case
studies reviewed had these three factors. We recognize that we did not examine every historical case across all domains and
that we evaluated only cases of success. We are unable to say whether these three factors existed in unsuccessful cases, as we
had very few, if any, examples of failed solutions. The notable “failures” included the Crusader (advance artillery system), the
Comanche (vertical lift), Future Combat Systems, and the Ground Combat Vehicle. However, these were all materiel solutions,
which were not a focus of this report.
c
Although there is no quantitative way of defining rapid in this context, we consider rapid institutionalization to mean that as
many different domains as possible were working in parallel to field the solution as quickly as possible.
