ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 298 1
O
n May 12, 2016, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)
announced its markup of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for scal year 2017. Committee chairman John McCain (R-
AZ) stated that the bill “contains the most sweeping reforms of the organization
of the Department of Defense [DOD] in a generation.”
2
e House Armed Ser-
vices Committee version of the NDAA contained fewer reforms, but the com-
mittee emphasized that reform was necessary because “security challenges have
become more transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional. . . . U.S. superi-
ority in key warghting areas is at risk with other nations’ technological advances;
and . . . [DOD] lacks the agility and adaptability necessary to support timely
decisionmaking and the rapid elding of new capabilities.”
3
One common reaction to the volume and diversity of reforms in the NDAA
is confusion about the core problems limiting Pentagon performance. Yet the lit-
erature on defense reform, as well as the Senate and House reports accompany-
ing the NDAA, does reveal a common core concern: Pentagon decisionmaking
is too slow and consensus-based to manage complex security challenges well.
Consensus decisionmaking is widely understood to yield highly compromised
products that oer senior leaders suboptimal results.
4
Consensus decisionmak-
ing also limits Pentagon headquarters performance in acquisition and mission
management and, by denition, precludes eective strategy.
5
e tendency of the Pentagon to default to consensus decisionmaking that
protects the equities of its functional components at the expense of better en-
terprise-wide solutions has been noted for decades. For example, a 1980 study
found the Pentagon was “strongly vertical and compartmentalized, with little
horizontal integration and teamwork.”
6
Other studies and senior DOD lead-
ers have echoed this concern, claiming the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of
Cross-Functional Teams in
Defense Reform: Help or
Hindrance?
by Christopher J. Lamb
STRATEGIC FORUM
National Defense University
About the Author
Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is a
Distinguished Research Fellow in the
Center for Strategic Research, Institute
for National Strategic Studies, at the
National Defense University. He is on
record supporting the use of cross-
functional teams by the Pentagon,
1
and
national security reform more generally,
which he reviews in Strategic Forum No.
293, National Security Reform and the
2016 Election (NDU Press, March 2016).
Key Points
There is strong bipartisan support for
Section 941 of the Senate’s version of
the National Defense Authorization
Act for 2017, which requires the Pen-
tagon to use cross-functional teams
(CFTs). CFTs are a popular organiza-
tional construct with a reputation for
delivering better and faster solutions
for complex and rapidly evolving
problems.
The Department of Defense reaction
to the bill has been strongly negative.
Senior ocials argue that Section
941 would “undermine the authority
of the Secretary, add bureaucracy,
and confuse lines of responsibility.”
The Senate’s and Pentagon’s dia-
metrically opposed positions on the
value of CFTs can be partially recon-
ciled with a better understanding of
what CFTs are, how cross-functional
groups have performed to date in
the Pentagon, and their prerequisites
for success. This paper argues there
is strong evidence that CFTs could
provide impressive benets if the
teams were conceived and employed
correctly.
August 2016
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH
