LESSONS ENCOUNTERED
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Hooker and Collins
Excerpts from
LESSONS ENCOUNTERED
Henry Kissinger has reminded us that “the study of history oers no manual
of instruction that can be applied automatically; history teaches by analogy,
shedding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations.” At the
strategic level, there are no cookie-cutter lessons that can be pressed onto ev-
ery batch of future situational dough. e only safe posture is to know many
historical cases and to be constantly reexamining the strategic context, ques-
tioning assumptions, and testing the appropriateness of analogies.
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At times during the Long War, civil-military tension was compounded unnec-
essarily. Civilian decisionmakers can benet from a better understanding of
the complexity of military strategy and the military’s need for clear planning
guidance. Senior military ocers for their part require a deep understanding
of the policy/interagency process, an appreciation for the perspectives of civil-
ian counterparts, and a willingness to embrace, and not resist, the complexi-
ties and challenges inherent in our system of civilian control.
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Four-star generals and admirals are masters of Service and joint warghting,
but at the most senior levels, other attributes are necessary. ese include in-
teragency acumen; media savvy; a detailed understanding of congressional
relations; a strong grasp of the defense planning, programming, and budget-
ing system; and skill in multinational environments.
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A lesson here for future senior ocers is that there is no substitute for lifelong
learning. e study of history, a broad grasp of all the instruments of national
power with their strengths and weaknesses, condence and a decisive charac-
ter, and a fair portion of prudence and humility are all helpful when dealing
with future commitments and challenges.
Edited by Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins
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LESSONS
ENCOUNTERED
L
essons Encountered: Learning from
the Long War began as two questions
from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18
th
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta: What
were the costs and benets of the campaigns
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the
strategic lessons of these campaigns? e
Institute for National Strategic Studies at
the National Defense University was tasked
to answer these questions. e editors com-
posed a volume that assesses the war and
analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s con-
siderable in-house talent and the dedication
of the NDU Press team. e audience for
this volume is senior ocers, their stas, and
the students in joint professional military
education courses—the future leaders of the
Armed Forces. Other national security pro-
fessionals should nd it of great value as well.
e volume begins with an introduction that
addresses the diculty of learning strategic
lessons and a preview of the major lessons
identied in the study. It then moves on to an
analysis of the campaigns in Afghanistan and
Iraq from their initiation to the onset of the
U.S. Surges. e study then turns to the Surg-
es themselves as tests of assessment and ad-
aptation. e next part focuses on decision-
making, implementation, and unity of eort.
e volume then turns to the all-important
issue of raising and mentoring indigenous se-
curity forces, the basis for the U.S. exit strate-
gy in both campaigns. Capping the study is a
chapter on legal issues that range from deten-
tion to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles.
e nal chapter analyzes costs and benets,
dissects decisionmaking in both campaigns,
and summarizes the lessons encountered.
Supporting the volume are three annexes:
one on the human and nancial costs of the
Long War and two detailed timelines for his-
tories of Afghanistan and Iraq and the U.S.
campaigns in those countries.
e lessons encountered in Afghanistan and
Iraq at the strategic level inform our under-
standing of national security decisionmaking,
intelligence, the character of contemporary
NDU Press
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Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC
conict, and unity of eort and command.
ey stand alongside the lessons of other wars
and remind future senior ocers that those
who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound
to repeat them.
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e Institute for National Strategic Studies
(INSS) conducts research in support of the
academic and leader development programs
at the National Defense University (NDU) in
Washington, DC. It provides strategic sup-
port to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Sta, and unied com-
batant commands. INSS also interacts with
other U.S. Government agencies, other edu-
cational institutions, and the broader nation-
al security community. It includes the Center
for Strategic Research, Center for Technology
and National Security Policy, Center for the
Study of Chinese Military Aairs, Center for
the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Center for Complex Operations, and NDU
Press.
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Jacket designed by Chris Dunham
U.S. Government Printing Oce
Cover photo: U.S. Army Soldiers with Echo
Company, 5
th
Cavalry Regiment, 172
nd
In-
fantry Brigade, prepare to clear building
during combined training exercise with Iraqi
soldiers near Bahbahani, Iraq, June 6, 2009
(DOD/Kim Smith)
Continued on back ap