inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 285 1
D
ating from Bashar al-Asad’s rst suppression of mass demonstrations in
April 2011, the war in Syria is now 3 years old, has killed more than
130,000 Syrians, and displaced nine million Syrians, two million as refu-
gees into neighboring countries.
1
Foreign intervention has increasingly shaped the
course of the ghting and will continue to have substantial regional consequences.
e complexity of this bitter, nominally internal struggle has dampened American
enthusiasm for joining the fray or even paying much attention to Syria, notwith-
standing the chemical weapon attacks on Gouta, east of Damascus, last August,
which captured the attention of the American people, media, and policy community.
With an international taboo broken and a Presidential redline crossed, public debate
spiked in August–September 2013 over U.S. interests in Syria and the limits on what
we will do to secure them. Debate did not result in a consensus for action.
e public remains broadly skeptical on a more forceful role as a result of
arguments that have focused on the costs of substantive action.
2
Some opposition
has been driven by resource constraints and some by isolationist principles. Other
opponents of action of any kind are concerned about precedents that would be
set by intervention, and historical analogies that should be heeded in deciding
whether to intervene at all. Resources, principles, and precedents are all important
enough to deserve rigorous examination. Unfortunately, the national dialogue so
far has not done those topics justice, but has been dominated conversely by as-
sumptions, comparisons with other recent conicts, and outright misconceptions.
is paper critically analyzes the most common arguments against substan-
tive U.S. involvement in the Syrian crisis and generally nds them wanting. Some
commentators have relied on misleading or inaccurate historical analogies to de-
scribe the current policy challenge. Others have been inaccurate in describing the
main players in the Syrian conict and the range of options available to Ameri-
can decisionmakers. Most dangerously, proponents of remaining aloof to the crisis
have ignored the costs of continued inaction in human and geopolitical terms. In
The Flawed Strategic
Debate on Syria
by Richard Outzen
Strategic Forum
National Defense University
About the Author
Colonel Richard Outzen, USA, is a
Senior Military Fellow in the Center
for Strategic Research, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, at the
National Defense University.
Key Points
Opponents of forceful U.S. action
in Syria have warned of dire
consequences, but have generally
failed to address the costs of
inaction. The results of episodic and
ambivalent action are also dire.
Those arguing against robust
assistance to the opposition have
used Afghanistan and other
historical analogies to support
their positions, but the arguments
frequently employ faulty history
and faulty reasoning.
There are options for coherent,
effective action with regional
support in pursuit of limited,
achievable goals.
January 2014
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH
