ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 292 1
T
his paper examines the Turkish think tank sector as part of a strat-
egy to invest in Turkish democratization in a manner that does not
prejudice security cooperation or the broader bilateral relationship.
e United States for over 60 years has promoted a Turkey that is politically
stable, economically prosperous, militarily capable, and democratically mature.
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As we head into 2016, the good news is that Turkey has had a party capable
of ruling and winning elections for 14 years, is a G20 economy, retains one of
the strongest military and security establishments in the world, and has estab-
lished civilian authority over the military in a durable manner. e bad news is
that this substantial progress has not resulted in a more transparent government
fully committed to Western democratic norms. Instead the result has been a
frequently unpredictable ally led by an increasingly authoritarian, albeit popular
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who outs Western norms with relish and
deviates from Western strategic consensus with ease. e sustained dialogue,
mutual understanding, consultation, and compromise that mark good partner-
ships are noticeably absent—and the formerly substantial American inuence
over Turkish policymaking is greatly diminished. At the same time, the United
States has an image problem to accompany its inuence decit, having experi-
enced a sustained loss of trust among the Turkish public.
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e inescapable fact is that Turkey is a far less dependent and far less trac-
table partner for the United States today than at any time during their bilateral
relationship. e Turks have clearly laid out a more independent foreign policy
doctrine and done their best to implement it; American audiences have not fully
appreciated this paradigm shift. Some observers—even long-time Turkey watch-
ers—wrongly attribute divergence of interest or policy to Islamist ideology, or
Erdoğan’s ego and caprice. Moreover, they fail to appreciate the fundamental
Supporting Democracy in
Erdoǧan’s Turkey: The Role of
Think Tanks
by Richard H.M. Outzen and Ryan Schwing
STRATEGIC FORUM
National Defense University
About the Authors
Colonel Richard H.M. Outzen, USA, is a
Senior Military Fellow in the Center for
Strategic Research, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, at the National Defense
University (NDU). Ryan Schwing is a
Research Assistant for Michael Pillsbury
and previously interned at NDU.
Key Points
Fifteen years into the era of President
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, U.S. inuence
on his inner circle and support base,
the new generation of Turkish strategic
thinkers, and the Turkish public at large
has diminished rather than improved.
American Turkey watchers have grown
frustrated with perceived divergence
of interests, values, and agendas. A
growing number consider Erdoğan
and his inner circle autocratic, dicult,
ideologically extreme, and dangerous.
U.S. interests would be better served by
avoiding confrontation and maintain-
ing close military-to-military coopera-
tion while also pressing for democrati-
zation in a patient, low-prole manner.
The emerging Turkish think tank sector
oers opportunities for doing just that.
The sector has grown dramatically over
the past 20 years and oers a window
for better understanding the revolution
in Turkish strategic thinking that now
perplexes many American observers.
Engaging Turkey’s think tanks would
support democratization.
The United States should participate
in Turkish think tank events, invite
their leaders to the United States, use
microgrants to strengthen liberal think
tanks, and collaborate on some studies.
This would improve understanding
of Turkish strategic thought, broaden
Turkish policy debate, and encourage
democratization.
May 2016
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH
