ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 294 1
I
n the past few months, China has announced a series of major reforms
to the organizational structure of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA):
the Central Military Commission (CMC) has been revamped, the four
general departments dissolved, new service headquarters created, and five
new theater commands established in place of the seven military regions
(MRs). These changes are part of a sweeping transformation of PLA insti-
tutions, force structure, and policy that will be ongoing through 2020. In
pursuing these reforms, China’s leaders hope both to tighten central politi-
cal control over a force that was seen as increasingly corrupt and to build
the PLA into a credible joint warfighting entity. Yet important obstacles
remain, and it may be years before the implications of these reforms come
into full view.
Major Organizational Reforms
Prior to the reforms, the PLA’s organization was based on a model imported
from the Soviet Union in the early 1950s.
1
Its three main pillars included the
following: (1) three services (army, navy, and air force) and the Second Artil-
lery Force (SAF), an independent branch responsible for China’s conventional
and nuclear missiles; (2) four general departments—General Sta Department
(GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Department
(GLD), and General Armaments Department (GAD); and (3) seven geograph-
ic MRs, listed in protocol order: Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou,
Chengdu, and Lanzhou, with subsidiary units drawn from the services. e
CMC stood atop these pillars and exercised the highest command authority in
the PLA.
2
is structure is depicted in gure 1.
China’s Goldwater-Nichols?
Assessing PLA Organizational
Reforms
by Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow
STRATEGIC FORUM
National Defense University
About the Authors
Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of
the Center for the Study of Chinese
Military Affairs (CSCMA), Institute
for National Strategic Studies, at the
National Defense University. Dr. Joel
Wuthnow is a Research Fellow in
CSCMA.
Key Points
The Chinese People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) is undertaking its most
signicant restructuring since
1949, including changes to all of
the PLA’s main organizational pil-
lars—the Central Military Commis-
sion, services, and theaters.
The reforms are modeled partly
on the U.S. military structure,
where combatant commanders
lead operations and the services
train and equip troops. However,
the PLA remains a Leninist military
responsible for defending Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) rule.
The reforms aim to tighten CCP
supervision over a force seen as
corrupt and unaccountable and
to enhance the PLA’s ability to
conduct joint operations across
multiple domains.
Theater commanders will be able
to develop force packages drawn
from all the services, and a new
Strategic Support Force will pro-
vide C4ISR support.
The reforms will create a short-
term organizational disruption,
but may enable more effective
joint warghting over the long
term. The PLA will have to over-
come signicant obstacles such as
continued ground force dominance
and inter-service rivalry to make
the reforms succeed.
April 2016
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS
