ndupress.ndu.edu SF No. 299 1
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hina’s ongoing modernization program is transforming the country’s
nuclear arsenal from one consisting of a few liquid-fueled, silo-based
missiles carrying single warheads to a larger force of more advanced
mobile solid-fueled missiles, some of which are capable of carrying multiple
warheads. Perhaps most signicant for its nuclear policies, China is also on the
verge of elding its rst credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, having already
completed four nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and with a fth
vessel currently under construction.
ough China has prioritized political control of its nuclear weapons and
maintained a distinctly restrained nuclear posture, Beijing’s emerging eet of
SSBNs will pose new challenges to Chinese command and control policies. But
which military organization will ultimately command China’s sea-based nuclear
forces? Some experts have predicted that the newly formed People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) Rocket Force, the successor to the former Second Artillery, will
assume control of the emergent SSBN force, though such a move would entail
substantial revision of China’s bureaucratic structures.
is article examines options for command and control of China’s sea-
based nuclear deterrent. It begins by examining evidence that the Rocket Force
and its predecessor were assigned exclusive control of the country’s land-based
arsenal. Next, it describes three notional command and control structures for
China’s future SSBN eet, which allocate varying degrees of control to the
PLA Navy and Rocket Force. Each of these command and control models
implies dierent requirements for the PLA’s personnel policies, institutional
organization, and physical infrastructure. e article then examines some of
the operational, bureaucratic, and political factors that will likely inuence the
future command and control structure of China’s SSBN force. It closes with a
China’s Future SSBN
Command and Control
Structure
By David C. Logan
STRATEGIC FORUM
National Defense University
About the Author
David C. Logan was a Research
Intern in the Center for the Study
of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute
for National Strategic Studies, at
the National Defense University,
and is a graduate student in the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs at Princeton
University.
Key Points
China is developing its rst cred-
ible sea-based nuclear forces. This
emergent nuclear ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) force will pose
unique challenges to a country that
has favored tightly centralized con-
trol over its nuclear deterrent. The
choices China makes about SSBN
command and control will have
important implications for strategic
stability.
Despite claims that the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force
will be responsible for all Chinese
nuclear forces, Chinese SSBNs
currently appear to be under the
control of the PLA Navy. However,
China may choose to revise its
command and control structures as
its SSBNs begin armed deterrent
patrols. There are three broad com-
mand and control models, allocat-
ing varying degrees of authority to
the PLA Navy or the Rocket Force.
China’s decisions about SSBN com-
mand and control will be mediated
by operational, bureaucratic, and
political considerations. A hybrid
approach to command and control,
with authority divided between the
navy and the Rocket Force, would
be most conducive to supporting
strategic stability.
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS
November 2016
