Introduction
The U.S. Army and DoD are long overdue in addressing a signicant capa-
bility and survivability shortcoming in its most fundamental formation—
the infantry squad. Four percent of the total uniformed force—the in-
fantry squad—has suered almost 90% of U.S. military combat deaths
since World War II. Although it is not surprising that front-line infantry
Soldiers, Marines and Special Forces suer casualties in higher proportion
than the rest of the military, the United States must do everything feasible
to minimize the blood spilled by its front-line warriors fullling their indis-
pensable role in defense of the nation.
Addressing this shortcoming is a political, strategic and moral issue. To pre-
vail against near-peer threats in the increasingly lethal 21st-century secu-
rity environment, the United States requires a military that is dominant in
close-combat ghting. (Close combat is “ground combat executed by dis
-
mounted infantry squad-sized formations carried out within line of sight of
the enemy and characterized by extreme violence.”)
2
It also requires lead-
ership and a population that is resilient enough to maintain the political will
necessary to see conicts through even with inevitable casualties. This re
-
silience only will be possible if the nation and its military keep faith with
I am committed to improving the combat preparedness, lethality, survivabil-
ity and resiliency of our nation’s ground close-combat formations. These
formations have historically accounted for almost 90% of our casualties
and yet our personnel policies, advances in training methods and equip-
ment have not kept pace with changes in available technology, human fac-
tors science and talent management best practices.
James N. Mattis, Secretary of Defense, 8 February 2018
1
Regaining Tactical
Overmatch: The Close
Combat Lethality Task Force
APRIL 2018
ILW SPOTLIGHT 18-2
PUBLISHED BY THE INSTITUTE OF LAND WARFARE
at the association of the united states army
ISSUE
The U.S. military must enhance the combat
preparedness, lethality, survivability and
resiliency of the nation’s ground close-
combat formations as a national strategic
imperative.
spotlight SCOPE
• Describes purpose, scope, mission and
desired outcomes of the Secretary of
Defense’s Close Combat Lethality Task
Force (CCLTF).
• Highlights strategic, operational and
tactical implications of the CCLTF.
• Describes relationship of the CCLTF with
Army Soldier Lethality and Synthetic
Training Environment (STE) cross func-
tional teams (CFTs); the Maneuver Force
Modernization Strategy (MFMS); and
ArmyWarghtingChallenges(AWFCs).
KEY POINTS
• Almost 90% of U.S. combat deaths occur
in infantry squads—a formation which
comprises just 4% of the U.S. military.
• The Army should approach the CCLTF
with a campaign-plan mindset and nest
this initiative with Soldier Lethality and
STE CFTs, MFMS and the AWFCs.
• High-payoff areas appear to be what
goes into the Soldier as opposed to what
goes on the Soldier. The human dimen-
sion is paramount.
• Close-combat overmatch is the linchpin.
To regain the competitive edge in close
combat, the Army as well as DoD should
treat infantry as an excepted function.
www.ausa.org
1
Establishment of the Secretary of Defense Close Combat Lethality Task Force, 8 February 2018.
Memo.
2
Secretary of Defense,
Directive-type Memorandum 18-001, “Establishment of the Close Combat
Lethality Task Force (CCLTF),” 16 March 2016. Memo.
by Colonel Daniel S. Roper, U.S. Army, Retired
