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Strengthening Delhi’s Strategic Partnerships in the Indian
Ocean
Darshana M. Baruah
INTRODUCTION
The Indian Ocean region (IOR) is a critical juncture of the wider Indo-Pacific. It is one of the most
crucial trade corridors that links the Middle East, Europe, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast and
Northeast Asia. As outlined by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Indian Ocean is
“[h]ome to nearly 2.7 billion people … carrying half of the world’s container ships, one third of the
world’s bulk cargo traffic, and two thirds of the world’s oil shipments.”
After the Cold War, the In-
dian Ocean remained relatively peaceful, with minimal geopolitical competition. India and the
United States have been the primary actors in the theater and largely accepted each other’s presence
and operations. After the Cold War, Washington welcomed a greater Indian role, with then–U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates encouraging India to be a “net provider of security in the Indian
Ocean and beyond.”
However, as China continues to expand its presence and deepen its engage-
ments across the Indo-Pacific, there is a new geopolitical competition emerging in the Indian Ocean.
While India perceives a growing Chinese presence as competition to its strategic and security role in
the IOR, Beijing is determined to stake its claim and emerge as a key player in the IOR. This ambi-
tion feeds into China’s larger objective of becoming a global maritime power.
India has a vital interest in the Indian Ocean, and as one of the IOR’s most prominent resident na-
val powers, its role in the IOR has been critical to maintaining peace and security. As China contin-
ues to expand its engagements and presence across the IOR, Delhi is beginning to review its mari-
time engagements and policies.
Much of Delhi’s advantage is rooted in geography and operational
experience, whereas it suffers from serious capacity constraints. Should China manage to find the
means and ways to sustain itself in the region and gain experience operating there, it will be able to
quickly overcome India’s advantages. Given that neither India nor China is looking to engage in a
military conflict to establish dominance, strategic signaling, positioning, power projection, and en-
hanced operational capabilities will be key to enabling India to maintain a favorable position in the
IOR in the next decade or so.
As India continues to modernize its military, engaging with key partners will strengthen its ability to
address emerging threats and China’s expanding presence in the IOR. This paper first explores In-
dia’s current approach to IOR chokepoints and how Delhi can leverage strategic partnerships to
shore up its advantages in the IOR. It then identifies presence, maritime domain awareness, strategic
Indian Ocean Rim Association, “About IORA,” iora.int, www.iora.int/en/about/about-iora.
Robert Gates, “America’s security role in the Asia–Pacific” (Shangri-la Dialogue, Singapore, May 30, 2009), https://ar-
chive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1357
For a brief summary of China’s deepening engagements in the IOR, see David Brewster, “China’s New Network of
Indian Ocean Bases,” The Lowy Interpreter, The Lowry Institute, January 2018, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-inter-
preter/chinas-new-network-indian-ocean-bases, and Darshana M. Baruah, “India in Maritime Asia,” in Realising the Indo-
Pacific: Tasks for India’s Regional Integration, ed. Gorden Flake et al. (Perth: Perth USAsia Centre at The University of West-
ern Australia, June 2017).
