The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) agreed to by Iran and the P5+1
(China, France, Germany, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) on July 14,
2015, represents a historic moment for U.S.
foreign policy. The agreement will have to be
judged based on its ability to help further four
key American objectives:
• Prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear
weapon;
• Increase stability in the Middle East;
• Strengthen the non-proliferation
regime; and
• Improve America’s global standing.
Leveraging the agreement to achieve these
objectives is far from a foregone conclusion.
Success will depend heavily on the policies
the United States and its partners pursue in
the aftermath of the agreement. Over the next
20–25 years, if implemented eectively, the
agreement could succeed in permanently
ending Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Al-
ternatively, if implementation fails, the JCPOA
could pave the way for an Iranian bomb in 15
years or sooner. The agreement could open
up new channels of cooperation with a more
moderate Iran and help stabilize the Middle
East, or it could cause increased destabiliz-
ing competition between Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and Israel. The agreement could strengthen
non-proliferation norms across the globe or
result in Middle Eastern states more aggres-
sively pursuing domestic enrichment capa-
bilities similar to that of Iran. Finally, the deal
could better position the United States in a
broader geopolitical competition with China
and Russia, or it could lead to the Chinese and
Russians taking advantage of the new chan-
nels open to Iran while the United States reaps
few if any benefits.
This commentary outlines a game-plan for
the United States that seeks to maximize the
upsides of a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran
while protecting against the negative implica-
tions of the deal. This task inherently includes
tensions that pull in opposite directions. The
United States will have to be prepared to
quickly reimpose sanctions in the event of
Iranian violations even as it encourages the
return of private businesses to Iran to ensure
meaningful sanctions relief. U.S. policy will
have to more forcefully counter Iran’s support
for surrogates and proxies in the Middle East
while seeking new avenues for U.S.-Iranian
engagement. However, history has shown that
with regional or global competitors such as
China or Russia, the United States is indeed
capable of both countering and engaging at
the same time and its approach to Iran should
be no dierent.
This paper provides a preview of a compre-
hensive report that the Center for a New
American Security will release in October and
lays out such a strategy based on six central
pillars and more than 45 associated policy rec-
ommendations that support the strategy.
Executive Summary
By Ilan Goldenberg, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Avner Golov,
Nicholas A. Heras, Ellie Maruyama, and Axel Hellman
and What Comes Next
The Iran Agreement
