NOVEMBER 2014
POLICY BRIEF
How This Ends
A Blueprint for De-Escalation in Syria
By Dafna H. Rand and Nicholas A. Heras
A
s the U.S.-led Coalition continues
airstrikes against the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS) and the al-Q
aida affiliate Jabhat
al-Nusra in Syria, the American public is asking:
What does the end game look like?
is brief oers a preliminary response, outlining
a process by which the Syrian civil conict could
end, however improbable that may now seem given
the bloodshed that has convulsed the country.
e Center for a New American Security’s recent
report, “e Tourniquet: A Strategy for Defeating
the Islamic State and Saving Iraq and Syria” by
Marc Lynch, oers a comprehensive strategy for the
United States to pursue in Iraq and Syria. is brief
follows up, detailing how a political “end game”
in Syria must be integrated into the current U.S.
military strategy to defeat ISIS.
ere is no perfect – or possibly even good –
outcome for the United States in Syria. Yet it
is becoming clear that the perpetuation of the
bloody civil conict is the worst of all possible
options – not only for Syrians, but also for the
pursuit of U.S. interests and values in the region.
A negotiated transition may be a viable way to
begin lessening the violence and humanitar-
ian toll, reducing the number of armed groups
operating in Syria, and combatting ISIS more per-
manently. ree years of regional spillover eects
from the Syrian conict cannot be reversed, but
attenuating the violence can begin to slow the
ows of terrorists, refugees, and instability from
Syria across the region.
As the United States and the Coalition train and
assist the moderate Syrian military opposition,
they should emphasize a clear end goal: the Syrian
armed opposition factions must, ultimately, view
themselves not only as warriors that are seeking
to overthrow Bashar al-Asad (and the political-
security syndicate that his father Haz built), but
also, and mainly, as the nucleus of a national army
that will uphold and protect an inclusive, multi-sect
political compact governing Syria aer Asad. In
the interim, this national army is needed to govern
fairly the areas outside of regime control, which
comprise nearly 70 percent of Syrian territory as of
2014. Suusing the ghting forces with the will to
coalesce into such an army may depend on whether
there is a viable political plan on the table.
e steps below oer an initial blueprint, a start-
ing point for discussion.
1
Today, a negotiated
