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The Cyber
Deterrence Problem
Abstract: What is the role of deterrence in an age where adept hackers can credibly
hold strategic assets at risk? Do conventional frameworks of deterrence maintain
their applicability and meaning against state actors in cyberspace? Is it possible
to demonstrate credibility with either in-domain or cross-domain signaling or is
cyberspace fundamentally ill-suited to the application of deterrence frameworks?
Building on concepts from both rational deterrence theory and cognitive theories of
deterrence this work attempts to leverage relevant examples from both within and
beyond cyberspace to examine applicability of deterrence in the digital age and for
digital tools in an effort to shift the conversation from Atoms to Bits and Bytes.
Keywords: cyber, deterrence, denial, punishment
Aaron F. Brantly
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science
Virginia Polytechnic and State University
United States
abrantly@vt.edu
2018 10th International Conference on Cyber Conict
CyCon X: Maximising Eects
T. Minárik, R. Jakschis, L. Lindström (Eds.)
2018 © NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn
Permission to make digital or hard copies of this publication for internal
use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non-prot or
non-commercial purposes is granted providing that copies bear this notice
and a full citation on the rst page. Any other reproduction or transmission
requires prior written permission by NATO CCD COE.
1. IntroductIon
The challenge of the digital era is not to dene deterrence. Deterrence is a well-
dened concept that has been studied and practiced throughout history and to an
even greater depth following the advent of nuclear weapons. The present challenge
it is to understand the role digital technologies play in the broader scope of interstate
deterrence. Deterrence in one domain rarely if ever operates independently of other
domains. Much of the literature on cyber deterrence focuses on within domain
deterrence. Yet, this is a dangerous constraint that elevates risks and minimizes the
probability of success. This paper seeks to draw out the literature on deterrence and
identify its applicability within a newly delineated domain of interactions, cyberspace.
The resultant analysis strives to encompass the complexity of deterrence and advance
an argument beyond within domain modeling.
