109
Drawing Inferences from
Cyber Espionage
Abstract: To survive a confrontation, it helps to understand other side’s capabilities
and intensions. Estimates of opposing capabilities rest on an empirical basis but
understanding the other side’s intentions is inferred from words and deeds.
Therein lies a dilemma common across all military domains: acts to alter the balance
of a confrontation can also shape the inferences that the other side draws about one’s
intentions. The dilemma also operates in cyberspace, but in unique ways.
First, efforts by one side to acquire information on the other can be read by the other
side as preparations for a cyber attack prefatory to a military attack.
Second, others may draw inferences from the fact of cyber espionage alone, even
though the basis for believing in a cyber security dilemma is weak.
Third, there are ways of carrying out cyber espionage that can mitigate inferences
that others draw about the imminence of cyber attack by, for example, limiting which
components within a network are targeted for eavesdropping or by using penetration
methods that do not leave arbitrary code behind.
Fourth, defenders themselves can also modulate their reactions in ways that limit
drawing unnecessary inferences.
Fifth, expectations of how well modulating cyber espionage can convey peaceful
intentions should be very modest.
All these are complicated by difculties in the target’s ascertaining a penetration’s
date, characterization, and authorship. We conclude with a call for those who would
penetrate military-related systems to think about the inferences that the other side may
draw if such penetrations are discovered.
Keywords: cyber espionage, cyber attack, signaling
Martin C. Libicki
Center for Cyber Security Studies
U.S. Naval Academy
Annapolis, MD, United States
libicki@usna.edu; libmazo@gmail.com
2018 10th International Conference on Cyber Conict
CyCon X: Maximising Eects
T. Minárik, R. Jakschis, L. Lindström (Eds.)
2018 © NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn
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