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Net Neutrality in the
Context of Cyber Warfare
Abstract: Real or potential connections between infrastructure of different security
levels, from relatively unprotected individual users up to interfaces with critical
national infrastructure, have made cyberspace a highly contested and congested
domain. But operating conditions within this domain strongly favour malicious
actors over legitimate operators seeking to provide security and protect systems and
information. Technical capabilities to establish dominance and cause damage in this
domain are widely distributed, but legal and ethical constraints prevent legitimate
actors from using them to their full potential.
Within this context, net neutrality presents a limiting factor on the capability of legitimate
actors to respond to harmful activity in cyberspace whose common aim is to install and
uphold a technical imbalance. Under the principle of net neutrality, each data packet
must be transmitted with equal priority, irrespective of its source, destination, content
or purpose. This is disadvantageous to cyber defence. Comparisons to jungle or arctic
warfare, where operating conditions are neutral and degrade the performance of each
combatant side equally, are invalid, as malicious operators are capable of technically
manipulating data trafc to their favour. While both malicious and legitimate actors
may have comparable capabilities, legitimate actors are bound to legal and political
restrictions, making them immobile in several cyber warfare scenarios. Transferring
the principles of net neutrality to real life scenarios corresponds to depriving military,
police and emergency operators from any privilege that allows them to respond to an
incident – in effect, depriving them of their blue lights and emergency powers even in
severe incidents targeting critical infrastructure that may threaten civilian lives.
This paper investigates the potential opportunities and challenges of an adjustment
to the principle of net neutrality to facilitate defensive action by legitimate actors;
how this adjustment could contribute to regaining control in congested cyber domains
Kim Hartmann
Conict Studies Research Centre
Oxford, United Kingdom
kim.hartmann@conictstudies.org.uk
Keir Giles
Conict Studies Research Centre
Oxford, United Kingdom
keir.giles@conictstudies.org.uk
2018 10th International Conference on Cyber Conict
CyCon X: Maximising Eects
T. Minárik, R. Jakschis, L. Lindström (Eds.)
2018 © NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn
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