1
International Working Group MBMDS
China’s nuclear
weapons
strategy and
modernization
program
Hui Zhang
Harvard University
Cambridge,
Massachusetts, USA
hui_zhang@hks.harvard.
edu
[This paper is a slightly
shorter version of a paper
by the author, which was
previously published in “As-
suring destruction forever:
2020 edition,” Allison Pytlak
and Ray Acheson ed., June
2020, Reaching Critical Will,
a project of the Women’s In-
ternational League for Peace
and Freedom.
https://www.reaching-
criticalwill.org/images/
documents/Publications/
modernization/assuring-de-
struction-forever-2020.pdf
Abstract
Recently published docu-
ments, news reports, and
other sources of open-
source information indicate
that China is accelerating its
current nuclear force mod-
ernization programme. It is
clear that it is driven largely
in response to the growing
United Stataes (U.S.) mis-
sile defense program, which
China perceives as a threat
to its minimum credible de-
terrence. While China is not
altering its nuclear doctrine,
it believes that it needs to
enhance the reliability, sur-
vivability, and eectiveness
of its retaliatory capability in
resonse to a rst-strike. In
addition to expanding the
size of its nuclear arsenal,
it is enhancing its delivery
capabilities, for example,
by increasing the number
of ICBMs and making them
more sophisticated. It is
building more Multiple In-
dependently Targetable Re-
entry Vehicle (MIRV) war-
heads as well as a new class
of ballistic missile subma-
rines. China’s ongoing nu-
clear modernization aims to
increase the survivability,
reliability, safety, and pene-
tration capability of its small
nuclear arsenal and thereby
assures a limited, reliable,
and eective counterattack
capability that will deter a
nuclear rst -strike. China’s
nuclear modernization pro-
gram will likely continue to
be guided by its nuclear pol-
icy, which is characterized
by a no-rst-use pledge and
a commitment to “minimum
nuclear deterrence.” Final-
ly, while China supports the
total elimination of nuclear
weapons, it does not be-
lieve it is in China’s interest
to participate in discussions
about nuclear disarmament
until the U.S. and Russia
reduce their arsenals to one
thousand each, or lower.
China‘s self-defense
nucelar strategy
Since its rst nuclear ex-
plosion in 1964, China has
maintained a minimum de-
terrent and a no-rst use
(NFU) pledge, both aimed
at avoiding a costly nucle-
ar arms race.
China’s 2019
White Paper on Defense
states:
“China is always committed
to a nuclear policy of no-
rst use of nuclear weap-
ons at any time and under
any circumstances, and not
using or threatening to use
nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon states,
or nuclear-weapon-free
zones unconditionally. China
advocates the ultimate com-
plete prohibition and thor-
ough destruction of nuclear
weapons. China does not
engage in any nuclear arms
race with any other country
and keeps its nuclear capa-
bilities at the minimum level
required for national securi-
ty. China pursues a nuclear
strategy of self-defense, the
goal of which is to maintain
national strategic security
by deterring other countries
from using or threatening to
use nuclear weapons against
China.”
1
While some western experts
and scholars are suspicious
of China’s NFU pledge, Chi-
na’s nuclear force posture
1 Informaon Oce of the
State Council of the People’s Republic
of China, “China’s Naonal Defense in
the new Era,” July 2019, hp://eng.
mod.gov.cn/publications/2019-07/24/
content_4846452.htm.
