HUDSON INSTITUTE
HOW TO STRENGTHEN US DETERRENCE AND
WEAKEN THE ATTEMPTS OF RIVAL NUCLEAR COERCION
1
POLICY MEMO
How to Strengthen US
Deterrence and Weaken the
Attempts of Rival Nuclear
Coercion
BY REBECCAH L. HEINRICHS
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
September 2022
On February 24, 2022, Russia started the largest European
war since 1945 as it intensied its invasion of Ukraine to a
new level and threatened escalation to nuclear war. Though
Vladimir Putin has not detonated a nuclear weapon, he used,
and continues to use,
1
his nuclear arsenal to threaten the
United States and other NATO nations against continuing
to support Ukraine’s defense. Through pre-invasion nuclear
saber-rattling,
2
verbally threatening to employ nuclear weapons
on the battleeld,
3
and putting such weapons on alert,
4
Russia caused President Joe Biden and his administration to
declare repeatedly their fears of “World War III”
5
and to adopt
a gradual, highly cautious approach to helping Ukraine. The
White House has chosen to provide only weapons suitable for
operations to allow Ukraine to achieve some tactical victories
and prevent Russia from a quick and nal victory,
6
but this
aid does not allow Ukraine to achieve and sustain the military
victories necessary to win the war.
7
Thus, Russia appears to have successfully used nuclear
threats to deter the United States from certain actions that
are on lower levels on the spectrum of escalation, enabling
itself to control escalation
8
to serve its aims. Russia’s explicit
and implicit nuclear threats deterred US ofcials from
providing Ukraine with real-time targeting data and heavy
artillery early in the war
9
and electronic warfare capabilities
later in the war.
10
The nuclear threats also caused US ofcials
to press Ukraine not to hit Russian targets deep behind
Russian lines.
11
Russian ofcials have ample grounds to
