CRS INSIGHT
Current Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Issues
February 21, 2017 (IN10655)
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Steven A. Hildreth
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Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in U.S. and Foreign National Security Programs (shildreth@crs.loc.gov, 7-7635)
Little detail is currently available about the Trump Administration's agenda for missile defense and whether current
policy or program direction might change. The Administration has thus far said only that it will "develop a state-of-the-
art missile defense system to protect against missile-based system attacks from states like Iran and North Korea." A
detailed defense budget will not be presented until later this spring, so there is uncertainty as to what precisely the BMD
budget and program will look like. Ongoing BMD issues of interest to Congress are summarized below.
Legislative Issues
The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 114-328
) made several notable changes that could have
significant effects on the direction of U.S. BMD policy and programs. First, the NDAA modified the National Missile
Defense Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-38; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note), which had emphasized deploying a national BMD system
"capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack." It now reads that the
United States should "maintain and improve an effective, robust layered missile defense system capable of defending
the United States, allies, deployed forces, against the developing and increasingly complex ballistic missile threat" (sec.
1681). Although conferees noted that the new provision does not require or direct the development of missile defenses
against any country or their strategic forces, neither does the new provision restrict such development. This is important
because, since the 1980s, the United States has explicitly asserted its BMD policy and programs are not directed at
Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear deterrent forces. Some policy experts believe this change could have significant
consequences for relations with Russia and China, while also affecting the scope of U.S. strategic nuclear and BMD
programs.
Second, the FY2017 NDAA (sec. 1683) encourages the Department of Defense (DOD) to examine the feasibility of
defeating space-based threats to space-based U.S. national security systems and to examine the feasibility of defeating
ballistic missile threats with a new generation of space-based missile defense capabilities. Although there are no
prohibitions against deploying nonnuclear weapons in space, the United States has not pursued space-based BMD
interceptor programs since the 1980s, and Congress has not demonstrated widespread budgetary or legislative support
such capabilities in space.
Third, the FY2017 NDAA (sec. 1684) directs DOD to review and report on the full range of offensive and defensive
capabilities of the United States to defeat potential ballistic missile threats. This would include the possibility of
