Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS21696
Updated December 2, 2005
U.S. Intelligence and Policymaking:
The Iraq Experience
Richard A. Best, Jr.
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
A continuing issue for Congress is the question of whether the U.S. Intelligence
Community failed to provide accurate information about Iraqi capabilities to develop
and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and whether the Bush Administration
systematically misused intelligence to garner support for launching Operation Iraqi
Freedom in March 2003 and for continuing military operations in Iraq. The Senate
Intelligence Committee submitted a report on the Intelligence Community’s
performance in July 2004 (S.Rept. 108-301), but a follow-on assessment of the use of
intelligence has not been prepared and has become the source of controversy that led to
a rare closed session of the Senate on November 1, 2005. This report explores in general
terms the relationship between the production of intelligence and the making of policy
as reflected in the period prior to the war against Iraq in March 2003 and the
implications for Congress. This report will be updated if circumstances warrant.
Background
Intelligence has an important but not conclusive role in support of the policymaking
process. Intelligence agencies collect information, process, and analyze it; they then
disseminate analytical products to officials throughout the federal government.
Policymakers, however, base their decisions on a wide variety of factors, including
available intelligence, but also on their own assessment of the costs and benefits of a
course of action (or inaction), considerations of geopolitical objectives, ideology,
available resources, diplomatic (and domestic political) risks — a variety of factors well
beyond the purview of intelligence agencies. Even when official justifications for a
chosen course of action highlight the conclusions of intelligence estimates, there are
usually multiple factors involved. Intelligence may be good or bad and policies may be
good or bad, but in the real world good policy may be made in the absence of perfect
intelligence and sound intelligence may not preclude making poor policy. This is not to
say that intelligence is irrelevant to policymaking, but that it is almost invariably
imperfect because hostile foreign countries and groups work hard to mask their
