CRS INSIGHT
Additional U.S. Ground Troops to Counter the Islamic
State? Five Questions
March 29, 2016 (IN10447)
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Middle East and North Africa
Related Authors
Kathleen J. McInnis
Andrew Feickert
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Kathleen J. McInnis, Analyst in International Security (kmcinnis@crs.loc.gov, 7-1416)
Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces (afeickert@crs.loc.gov, 7-7673)
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dunford recently noted that both he and Secretary of Defense Carter believe there
may be "an increase to U.S. forces in Iraq in the coming weeks."
These forces would be part of Operation Inherent
Resolve (OIR)—the military campaign to counter the Islamic State (IS)—which has three primary components:
coordinated air strikes, training and equipping local security forces, and targeted special operations based out of
northern Iraq. Proposals include the introduction of additional ground forces to secure territory once it has been retaken
from the Islamic State, and the introduction of additional trainers for local security forces. However, there are no clear-
cut answers to determining the suitability, size, and mission profile of the ground elements of any military campaign; it
is in many ways as much an art as it is a science. When evaluating proposals to introduce more ground forces for OIR,
Congress may ponder five questions:
What Are We Trying To Accomplish?
The first step in deciding the profile of a military campaign is determining the precise goals that armed forces are
expected to accomplish. According to the White House, the core goal of the U.S. strategy to counter the Islamic State is
to "degrade and ultimately destroy IS." United States Central Command was subsequently authorized to conduct a
campaign to work with local partners in order to "degrade and defeat" the Islamic State. Yet according to U.S. Army
doctrine, there are subtle yet important differences between these stated goals and military missions that, ultimately,
have implications for the disposition of forces on the ground. "Defeating" an enemy to the point where it no longer has
the political will or physical capability to fight is generally believed to require more intensive combat—and a more
significant ground presence—than "destroying" its ability to be effective in combat. "Degrading" is not clearly defined
