https://crsreports.congress.gov
Updated June 11, 2020
Congress, Civilian Control of the Military, and Nonpartisanship
The possible use of federal armed forces as part of the U.S.
executive branch’s response to incidents of violence during
racial justice protests has raised questions about how the
military is controlled by domestic political institutions and
the U.S. military’s relationship with American society.
Article I of the U.S. Constitution grants specific powers to
Congress, making the legislative branch a key actor in
governing, overseeing, and funding the U.S. military.
What Is Civilian Control of the Military?
How to advance the nation’s security while at the same time
ensuring that instruments of force do not undermine the
practice of American democracy has been a central question
since the founding of the United States, if not before.
The designers of the Constitution were deeply skeptical of a
standing army, as such a military instrument could also
overthrow the government it professed to serve, much like
Oliver Cromwell demonstrated in 1653 when he used his
army to disband the English Parliament. Consternation
regarding British deployment of its military to the
American colonies without the consent of local governing
officials was among the key grievances listed in the
Declaration of Independence. In the context of a new,
experimental, and democratic Republic, the Founding
Fathers believed that subordination of the military to the
authority of civil masters was critically important to prevent
the emergence of a new form of tyranny or dictatorship.
The principle of civilian control of the military places
ultimate authority over U.S. armed services in the hands of
civilian leadership, with civilian responsibility and control
of the military balanced between the executive and
legislative branches of the government. In some ways, the
relationship between the military and the civil society it
serves is a paradox: the military, by its very nature, has
coercive power that could threaten civil society. Yet
without a sufficiently strong and capable military, civil
society becomes vulnerable to attack, and the former might
not be able to defend the latter.
Civilian Control of the Military: Congressional and
Executive Branch Responsibilities
The Founding Fathers designed a system of civilian control
of the military in a manner that conformed with the
government’s overall architecture of checks and balances.
An elected President was designated the Commander-in-
Chief of the nation’s armed forces. This had the dual
advantage of ensuring that an elected civilian leader
presided over the nation’s army while at the same time
enhancing unity of command over the military. The
President was also granted the ability to commission
military officers, authority to appoint Secretaries to preside
over military services, and the responsibility to regularly
report to Congress on the state of the union.
Federalist Papers 46 and 59 show that the Founding Fathers
were also concerned about unitary executive control of the
military. The desire to ensure that the military reflected, and
was subordinate to, the will of the people therefore led to
considerable congressional powers on matters concerning
the armed services. These include the power to lay and
collect taxes for the common defense, the sole power to
declare war, the ability to raise and support armies, and the
authority to establish rules and regulations for the army,
navy, and militias when in service of the United States. To
further strengthen civilian control of the military, a
provision prohibited the appropriation of money for the
army for a period longer than two years.
In the post-World War II era, Congress has exercised this
constitutional authority in a number of ways, including (but
not limited to) the following:
Annual strategy and posture hearings overseeing the
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) plans and programs.
Annually authorizing the scope and priorities for the
military’s budget and appropriating monies accordingly.
Establishing new service branches of the U.S. military,
such as the U.S. Space Force in 2019 (P.L. 116-92).
Establishing new components of the U.S. military, such
as U.S. Special Operations Command (P.L. 99-661).
Setting key DOD strategy production requirements, such
as the National Defense Strategy (P.L. 114-328).
Consenting upon the nominations of senior leaders to
DOD civilian and military positions.
Cancellation of weapons systems, as with the MBT-70
Supertank in 1971.
Establishing authorities for DOD’s noncombat
cooperative activities with other nations’ military and
security establishments (Title 22 U.S. Code; Title 10
U.S. Code, Chapter 16).
Organizing the military chain of command, for example
through the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (P.L. 99-433).
Requiring reporting on key issues and areas of interest
to Congress, such as the semi-annual Report on Stability
and Progress in Afghanistan (P.L. 110-181).
Setting criteria for military promotions, for example by
requiring military staff in a “joint” position before
becoming eligible for a General or Flag Officer position
in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (P.L. 99-433).
Setting personnel policies, including repealing DOD’s
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy toward gay service
members in the military (P.L. 111-321).
