1
CRS Report RL31349, Defense Budget for FY2003: Data Summary, by Stephen Daggett and
Amy Belasco. See p. 16 for historical personnel levels and p. 17 for force structure levels. End
strength refers to the number of uniformed personnel at the end of a fiscal year and is a measure
of the total size of the active forces. Force structure counts major combat elements, such as
divisions or carrier battle groups, and does not directly reflect support elements.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS21754
Updated February 10, 2005
Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size
for the United States?
Edward F. Bruner
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
For several years, some Members of Congress and other military analysts have
argued that the U.S. Armed Forces are too small to adequately meet all the requirements
arising in the post-Cold War era, and particularly in the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT). In January 2004, the Department of Defense acknowledged a problem by
temporarily adding 30,000 troops to the authorized active duty end strength of the Army.
Congress addressed the issue by raising statutory end strength in the FY2005
authorization bill (P.L. 108-375). This report describes the background of this action,
current Administration planning, and assesses significant issues for the 109
th
Congress.
The report will be updated.
Background
Throughout the Cold War, end strength of the U.S. active duty force never dropped
below 2.0 million personnel and peaked at over 3.5 million during the Korean and
Vietnam Wars.
1
From 1989 to 1999, end strength dropped steadily from 2.1 million to
1.4 million, where it has remained. Force structure dropped even more with active Army
divisions, for example, going from 18 to 10. Expectations that military requirements
would diminish, however, were not realized; U.S. forces deployed to new missions in
such places as the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and, with the recent advent
of the GWOT, Afghanistan and other far-flung places. The experience of Operation Iraqi
Freedom suggests that U.S. ground forces, in particular, are stretched thin.