O C T O B E R 2 0 0 8
Nuclear disarmament is higher on the U.S.
and international agenda than it has been
since the beginning of the nuclear age.
George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William
Perry, and Sam Nunn have urged “turning
the goal of a world without nuclear weapons
into a practical enterprise among nations.”
Barack Obama has pledged to “renew the
goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”
John McCain has said “the time has come to
take further measures to reduce dramatically
the number of nuclear weapons in the world’s
arsenals.” British Prime Minister Gordon
Brown has expressed the need “to acceler-
ate disarmament amongst possessor states,
to prevent proliferation to new states, and to
ultimately achieve a world that is free from
nuclear weapons.” Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh has said that “India is fully
committed to nuclear disarmament that is
global, universal, and nondiscriminatory in
nature.”
These are leaders of states that have nuclear
weapons. People in the vast majority of coun-
tries that don’t have them say, “It’s about time,
but is this talk of nuclear disarmament merely
public relations?”
Of course, not all American leaders agree
that a world without nuclear weapons is de-
sirable. Former Democratic cabinet secretaries
Harold Brown and John Deutch argue that
“the goal, even the aspirational goal, of elimi-
nating all nuclear weapons is counterproduc-
tive.” Republican Senator John Kyl insists
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons:
Why the United States Should Lead
G E O R G E P E R K O V I C H
Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
E N D O W M E N T F O R I N T E R N A T I O N A L P E A C E
CARNEGIE
n
The next American president should emphasize the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and really mean it.
n
The verification and enforcement mechanisms that would be required to achieve this would augment U.S. and
global security at a time when the nuclear industry will likely expand globally.
n
Without a clearer commitment to the elimination of all nuclear arsenals, non–nuclear-weapon states will not sup-
port strengthened nonproliferation rules, inspections, and controls over fissile materials.
n
The accounting and control over nuclear materials that would be necessary to enable nuclear disarmament would
greatly reduce risks that terrorists could acquire these materials.
n
If nuclear deterrence would work everywhere and always, we would not worry about proliferation. If nuclear
deterrence is not fail-safe, the long-term answer must be to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons
to zero.
S U M M A R Y
FOREIGN
POLICY
for the Next President
