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Speaking a Common Risk Management Language with Executives and Program Managers
John Fellows, M.S., PMP; A-P-T Research, Inc.; Huntsville, AL, USA
Dustin Nix, M.S., PMP; A-P-T Research, Inc.; Huntsville, AL, USA
Keywords: risk, risk management, project management, risk mapping
Abstract
The characteristics of risk and risk management (RM) vary significantly from discipline to
discipline. For instance, probability scales may differ by orders of magnitude, the severity
definitions often have minimal overlap, and even the definition of “risk” typically differs and
sometimes includes positive outcomes. These differences can create confusion and uncertainty
during program execution, manufacturing, and/or operational implementation. As with most
problems, mutual understanding is a key first step to determining solutions. Installation
commanders, production and manufacturing executives, and program managers must make cost,
schedule, and performance decisions daily and must rely, in part, on the safety professional’s
assessment of risk(s). This requires the safety professional to “tailor” the RM process and
language to ensure understanding and optimize a commander’s or PM’s decision-making. This
paper explores the risk and RM landscape between program and operational or system risks,
environmental, safety and occupational health (ESOH) risks, and Ammunition and Explosive
(AE) risks with the goal of clearly outlining how risk is described and managed from often-
interacting disciplines.
Introduction
In today’s approach of integrated program, project, and operational management, each
contributing discipline employs a unique language. Similar words or phrases are often used
across disciplines, though with disparate meanings. Interdisciplinary risk management (RM)
approaches should always involve the commander, operational leader, and/or Project Manager
(PM). In most projects, the commander or PM is either the approval authority of each identified
risk, or the conduit to upper managers for final approval. Explosive manufacturers,
demilitarization, storage and test sites, in addition to ships and weapons platforms have PMs,
commanders, or directors that also assess risks and work to optimize multiple competing cost,
schedule, and performance factors. These individuals control budgets and schedules associated
with risk mitigations, investment, and verification. Meanwhile, the characteristics of system
safety and explosive safety risk are often fundamentally different than the characteristics of risks
regularly managed by the commander or PM – the probability scales differ by orders of
magnitude, the severity definitions have minimal overlap, and the generally accepted PM
definition of “risk” includes both positive and negative outcomes.
Do we understand these differences as engineering professionals? How can we mitigate the
effects to improve the success of our projects? How do we quantify risks to assist the PM with
decision-making?
To provide consistency and effectively communicate the challenges and solutions presented in
this paper, we have attempted to use a “common language” familiar to government, industry, and
