Article
Chain Innovation Mechanism of the Manufacturing Industry in
the Yangtze River Delta of China Based on Evolutionary Game
Na Yu
1,
* and Chunfeng Zhao
2
Citation: Yu, N.; Zhao, C. Chain
Innovation Mechanism of the
Manufacturing Industry in the
Yangtze River Delta of China Based
on Evolutionary Game. Sustainability
2021, 13, 9729. https://doi.org/
10.3390/su13179729
Received: 3 August 2021
Accepted: 27 August 2021
Published: 30 August 2021
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1
College of Economics and Management, Hefei University, Hefei 230601, China
2
College of Civil Engineering, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China; zhaowindy@hfut.edu.cn
* Correspondence: yn2016@hfuu.edu.cn
Abstract:
It is of great theoretical and practical significance to achieve high-quality development
that promotes the transformation of digestion, absorption, and re-innovation to an independent
innovation model, actively participating in the restructuring of the industrial chain, and enhancing
the status of the Yangtze River Delta in the global innovation chain. This study constructs a tripartite
evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation led by the government, participated by up-
stream enterprises and downstream enterprises. Moreover, this article analyzes the strategic choices
of the tripartite entities in the process of collaborative innovation, and the simulation analyzes the in-
fluencing factors of the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises’ collaborative
innovation strategy selection. The results indicate that the government, upstream enterprises, and
downstream enterprises have different degrees of influence on each other’s willingness to participate.
In addition, the analysis proves that government policy support and financial support have different
impacts on upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises.
Keywords:
chain collaboration innovation; evolutionary game; synergistic interests; government
support; penalties for breach of contract
1. Introduction
Faced with the “structural slowdown” of the global economy, the Chinese government
has proposed a national development strategy that shifts from relying mainly on factors
and investment to being driven by technological innovation [
1
,
2
]. The manufacturing
industry is a field that gathers many new patents, new technologies, and new product
applications [
3
–
5
]. The scientific and technological innovation capability of the manufac-
turing industry is the key to promoting high-quality economic development and plays
an important role in building a modern economic system [
6
–
10
]. From the perspective
of domestic development, regional integration in the Yangtze River Delta has become a
national strategy [
11
,
12
]. The market segmentation brought about by local free competition
and the consequences of independent governance have seriously affected the collaborative
innovation in the development of science and technology, resulting in weak cooperation
between manufacturing enterprises [
13
]. From the perspective of international prospects,
for a long time, multinational enterprises in developed countries in Europe and the United
States have mostly occupied the R&D link of the manufacturing industry chain, mastered
the key core technologies, and formed core competitiveness by relying on their dominant
position in the global value chain to occupy the commanding heights of international
competition [
4
,
14
,
15
]. The current trade friction between China and the United States and
the outbreak of the new crown pneumonia have caused the global economy to continue to
downturn [
16
]. The cut-off of certain “stuck neck” technologies has caused the entire in-
dustrial chain to break, with the effect of “one sword sealing the throat” [
17
]. The situation
that key core technologies, key links in the production process, and key components are
controlled by others has not been completely reversed [
18
]. How to achieve the “1+1>2”
Sustainability 2021, 13, 9729. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13179729 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability
