USI of India | An article by USI
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A Model Counter-insurgency Framework
Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd)*
Introduction
India has faced many insurgencies. The first virtually started a
day before Independence, on 14 August 1947.
This
was when the leader of the Naga
National Council (NNC), Angami Zapu Phizo hoisted the national flag of an Independent
Naga country at Kohima.
A
day later, when India’s Independence was announced and the
Indian flag was being hoisted at Kohima, no Nagas attended the function.
The
actual
Naga insurgency started later when an ‘underground army’ was created by the NNC and
began attacking the Police stations and other Government offices.
Later
in 1955, Angami
Zapu Phizo secretly crossed into East Pakistan and sought help from the Pakistan
Government to arm and train the Naga cadres to fight the Indian Government.
Later in March 1966, the Mizo insurgency broke out. The next wave of insurgency
was in Manipur. Here there were incipient insurgencies from the 1960’s, but the first
serious wave came in mid 1970’s when the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s
Revolutionary Army of Kangleipak (PREPAK) began attacks on Police stations. Insurgency
in Assam broke out in 1985. This was followed by an insurgency of the Bodos in Udalguri,
Assam- the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). There were a few minor
insurgencies in Meghalaya, North Cachar Hills and Karbi Anglong. The next major
insurgency was in Kashmir that began in 1989. This was directly abetted by Pakistan
irregulars infiltrating and assisting the local insurgents and also fighting directly with the
Government forces. The last insurgency is the Maoist insurgency of the Adivasis and
scheduled castes demanding land and forest rights.
In
any insurgency, the root causes must be first identified.
These
should be
addressed, while armed measures are adopted against the insurgents, who have taken to
arms against the State. Regrettably in most cases, the State has not cared to identify and
address the just grievances of the insurgent groups and the insurgencies have festered for
years sapping the energies and wealth of the Country.
In
some cases, the State has
consciously ignored the rights of the people, thereby directly provoking the distressed
concerned people to take to arms.
Such
was the insurgency in Assam and that of the
Maoist insurgency in Central and South India.
I have had a long experience of insurgencies in the Northeast; particularly the
insurgencies in Manipur, the insurgency of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA),
the Naga insurgency and the prolonged insurgency in Kashmir. I also did a course in
Guerilla Warfare in the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, where I got a chance to study some of
the insurgencies worldwide. I studied the insurgency of the Huks in the Philippines, the
insurgency of the Communist guerillas in Malaya, the insurgencies in North Viet Nam and
South Vietnam, the terrorist insurgency of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland,
the insurgencies in Kenya, Algeria, and Cyprus. I also studied the Cuban insurgency and
little known insurgencies of the Tupamaros in Uruguay and of the Shining Path in Peru.
From
this background knowledge and practical experience, I have synthesised a
‘Doctrine of Counter-insurgency’ which I feel may be useful for forces deployed in such
operations.
The
doctrine is practical and I have implemented many of the points as
Inspector General Operations in Operation Bajrang and Operation Rhino in Assam in 1990-
93 and in the counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir in 1993-95.
The Preparatory Phase
In any insurgency which is caused by disaffection among the populace of the region there
are clear indications of a preparatory phase before insurgent groups are formed and they
take to arms.
An
alert intelligence unit of the Government can easily discern this phase
and should warn the Government to remove the constraints causing the disaffection. If,
despite the warnings from the Intelligence units of the field formations, the Government
persists with status quo policies, an insurgency will follow as surely as night follows a day.
Take the example of the looming insurgency in Assam. It was the year 1982. I was
