LAND WARFARE DOCTRINE 2018 OF INDIAN ARMY – A CRITIQUE
Maj Gen P K Mallick, VSM (Retd)
“I am tempted to declare that whatever doctrine the Armed
Forces are working on, they have got it wrong. I am also
tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it
wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly
when the moment arrives. It is the task of military science in an
age of peace to prevent the doctrine being too badly wrong.”
- Sir Michael Howard
Doctrine provides guidance for all aspects of a service’s activities, including training,
organization and force structure. In the absence of a clearly articulated doctrine, a
service may have a difficult time maintaining a coherent approach to its preparation
for future war. Paying attention to military doctrine is important for following reasons:
Doctrine can provide insight into the kinds of wars a military expects it will
have to fight in the near future.
A study of doctrine can provide a guide as to how a military might fight the
wars it expects.
The requirements of military doctrine often shape a military’s procurement
pattern. It is one thing to monitor the acquisition of new weapons systems;
however, to evaluate their contribution to a state’s military power one must
also know how they will be used. Insights into all of these areas can be gained
by studying a military’s doctrine.
Doctrine Writing in Indian Army
The Indian army’s doctrine was first published in the form of a book entitled,
Fundamentals, Concepts, Doctrine – Indian Army (1998) Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi was
the Army Commander, ARTRAC. It was a book with red cover page. One wonders if
you can lay a hand on this book.
The second time Indian Army’s doctrine was published in 2004 under the aegis of
the then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS ) General NC Vij, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM,
ADC.
