The Roots of Responsive Logistics: Trails and Tails in Vietnam
LTC Marian E. Vlasak–US Army
In keeping with this session’s theme of “incorporating changes in asym-
metrical operations,” it appears that logistical experiences from both sides of the
Vietnam War suggest some perspectives worthy of reconsideration in light of on-
going asymmetrical operations. Currently, the Army is seeking new ways to not
only provide responsive logistics to our own forces in austere environments far
from home, but also seeking to devise effective methods of countering insurgent
activities.
The title of this presentation attempts to capture what I see as an interesting
and timely need with some important implications for modern military logisti-
cians as well as strategists and tacticians. While this lecture has been billed as
the “logistics of insurgencies” my intent is to not only “get to know the enemy”
in the Vietnam conflict but to also juxtapose their evolving practices against then
concurrent developments and changes in American and allied practices. Through
this analysis of each side’s ability to adapt and change over the course of the war
I hope to finally suggest some insights of relevance for contemporary logistics
operations in asymmetrical environments.
Historically, examinations of this type of warfare and the effectiveness of
insurgent activities and changing practices have been approached from tactical or
ideological perspectives—less so from the nuts and bolts of how such movements
are materiely sustained.
This brings us to my favorite question about military logistics in asymmetrical
warfare—Why is it that historically, insurgents are able to “make a little bit of
materiel go a long way”? How come with seemingly minimal logistical support
and resources, insurgents can achieve effects that are disproportionate to the level
of “logistical effort” put into their enterprises? I suspect that the answer cannot
be simply chalked up to “tactics.” Conversely, why is it that counterinsurgency
efforts seem to consume unending amounts of materiel? Even so, much of it
often seems to be “wasted”? What is going here?
During this past year as the Combat Studies Institute’s Arthur L. Wagner Fel-
low, I examined methods of critical supply with a focus on the American experi-
ence from the Second World War to the present. So it is with the 20
th
century’s
defi ning conflict, that I will begin because the roots of both sides’ logistic practic-
es in Vietnam stem most notably from that conflict—though I fully acknowledge
that insurgent or guerrilla warfare certainly has a much longer history.
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