14 Parameters
The 21st Century Security
Environment and the Future
of War
COLIN S. GRAY
S
ome commentators and observers of international affairs—including the
author—claim to have a unied theory of strategy, a unied theory of
war, and a cunningly connected meta-narrative for the twenty-rst century,
indeed for all of history. They exult in being reductionists (in the good sense
of the term), to be able to say with condence, “Strategy is really all about
. . . .” This point of view endorses the Thucydidean triptych which holds
that the primary motives behind diplomatic and belligerent behaviors are
“fear, honor, and interest.”
1
That triad of genius is worth a library of modern
scholarship and social scientic rigor on the causes of war. But beware of
the pretentiously huge idea that purports to explain what everybody else,
supposedly, has been too dumb to grasp. Ask yourselves, for example, is
Philip Bobbitt’s 2008 book, Terror and Consent, the tour de force that reveals
all about twenty-rst century conict, or is it wanting at its core, albeit
protected by a great deal of insight and decoration?
2
Or, to tread on riskier
ground, when General Sir Rupert Smith writes about “war amongst the
people” as comprising the conceptual key to twenty-rst century warfare, is
this a critically important insight, or is it a case of conceptual overreach?
3
New-sounding terms and phrases, advanced by highly persuasive
people with apparently solid credentials, can usually nd a ready audience.
To expand on this point, ofcials and senior military ofcers are, by
profession, problem solvers. They are always inclined to be credulous when
presented with apparent novelty, especially when the presentation is done
in a welcoming and digestible style. Ofcials do not want to be told that
