Dominoes on the Durand Line?
Overcoming Strategic Myths in
Afghanistan and Pakistan
by Joshua Rovner and Austin Long
Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant
professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. The views expressed here are
solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, or
the Department of Defense.
No. 92
The death of Osama bin Laden pres-
ents an important opportunity to reassess
U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Current U.S.
thinking centers on two interests. The first
is preventing al Qaeda and its Taliban al-
lies from reestablishing a safe haven. The
second is preventing the violence in Af-
ghanistan from destabilizing Pakistan,
thus putting its nuclear forces at risk and
increasing the likelihood of nuclear ter-
rorism. Coalition strategy is based on the
assumptions that the only way to deny al
Qaeda safe haven is by building a strong
central Afghan state and that Pakistan’s
nuclear complex will become increasingly
vulnerable to militant attacks if the Tali-
ban succeeds in Afghanistan.
Both assumptions are wrong. The Unit-
ed States does not need to build a state in
Afghanistan because the conditions that
allowed al Qaeda safe haven in the 1990s
have permanently changed. Moreover, the
steps needed to help Pakistan secure its nu-
clear arsenal have nothing to do with the
war in Afghanistan. Policymakers should
scale back their ambitions in Afghanistan.
If they do so, they could cut troop levels by
80–90 percent while defending core U.S. in-
terests and dramatically reducing the costs
to America in both blood and treasure.
June 14, 2011
Executive Summary
