The Evolution of a Pakistani Militant Network
September 15, 2011
By Sean Noonan and Scott Stewart
For many years now, STRATFOR has been carefully following the evolution of
"Lashkar-e-Taiba" (LeT), the name of a Pakistan-based jihadist group that was
formed in 1990 and existed until about 2001, when it was officially abolished. In
subsequent years, however, several major attacks were attributed to LeT, including
the November 2008 coordinated assault in Mumbai, India. Two years before that
attack we wrote that the group, or at least its remnant networks, were nebulous but
still dangerous. This nebulous nature was highlighted in November 2008 when the
"Deccan Mujahideen," a previously unknown group, claimed responsibility for the
Mumbai attacks.
While the most famous leaders of the LeT networks, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed and
Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, are under house arrest and in jail awaiting trial, respectively,
LeT still poses a significant threat. It's a threat that comes not so much from LeT as a
single jihadist force but LeT as a concept, a banner under which various groups and
individuals can gather, coordinate and successfully conduct attacks.
Such is the ongoing evolution of the jihadist movement. And as this movement
becomes more diffuse, it is important to look at brand-name jihadist groups like LeT,
al Qaeda, the Haqqani network and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan as loosely affiliated
networks more than monolithic entities. With a debate under way between and within
these groups over who to target and with major disruptions of their operations by
various military and security forces, the need for these groups to work together in
order to carry out sensational attacks has become clear. The result is a new, ad hoc
template for jihadist operations that is not easily defined
and even harder for
government leaders to explain to their constituents and reporters to explain to their
readers.
Thus, brand names like Lashkar-e-Taiba (which means Army of the Pure) will
continue to be used in public discourse while the planning and execution of high-
profile attacks grows ever more complex. While the threat posed by these networks
to the West and to India may not be strategic, the possibility of disparate though well-
