Finding Strategic Balance
By
Peter Garretson
Journal Article |
Dec 23 2013 - 12:19pm
Finding Strategic Balance: How Should the USAF Balance Continuing Irregular Requirements with
High-end A2/AD[i] Requirements?
Peter Garretson
How should the USAF balance continuing irregular requirements with high-end A2/AD requirements?
Should the USAF:
A.
Continue on the current path, purchasing an exquisite force of the most capable high-end
platforms (F-35) able to penetrate and survive in a contested environment, assuming they can
handle air operations in a more benign environment as a lesser included case, or
A.
Commit to a balanced force, trading some of our niche high-end fighter forces to finance
investment in low-end aircraft more appropriate for irregular operations and shaping?
Fundamentally, is it better for the nation to seek to acquire 1,763
[ii]
exquisite F-35s, or should we accept
small reductions in the F-35 program of record to invest in low-end forces used to build partnerships and
carry the load of the Nation’s many “low intensity” military missions. Is the nation in a better position
with 1,763 F-35’s and no low-end forces, or to acquire 1,739 F-35’s and a balanced fleet of low-cost, daily
employable IW-relevant aircraft (224 light attack aircraft + 115 light mobility aircraft)?
Two Force Structures Illustrated[iii]
This paper argues that the balanced force enables the USAF to better execute its range of global missions
than the exquisite force. It further argues that balanced investment in an IW-capable low-end force
actually is a more comprehensive strategy to counter A2/AD.
The balanced force enables a broader strategy of shaping and setting strategic conditions, opening up new
avenues for engaging partner nations with developing air forces on the periphery of states of concern.
