AbstrAct: The US Army has a major, strategic role to play in the
Indo-Asia-Pacic theater. That role can be broken down into three
broad areas—bolstering defense of allies and deterring aggression,
promoting regional security and stability through security coop-
ertion, and ameliorating the growing US-China security dilemma.
Employing strategic landpower in each of these areas is not without
challenges—especially in the face of sequestration—yet not making
use of the Army will result in fewer policy options.
I
n the rush to the Indo-Asia-Pacic theater prompted by the January
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, it has become conventional
wisdom to say the US Army has only a minimal role in the rebal-
ancing effort underway. Advocates of this perspective assume that the
Pacic theater—with its massive distances—is far more suitable to the
platform-intensive Air Force and Navy, than the soldier-centric Army.
1
They then argue that, since the Army’s primary mission is ghting and
winning the nation’s wars, the Army’s role in the Pacic is largely limited
to the Korean Peninsula.
The Army is not blameless in this respect. According to one promi-
nent analyst, the Army’s, “organizational culture continues to focus
nearly exclusively on state-on-state war.”
2
Organizational bias has also
adversely affected how the institutional Army embraced the impor-
tance of promoting interoperability, developing coalition capability,
and building partner capacity.
3
And this bias persists despite efforts by
General Ray Odierno, the Army’s Chief of Staff, to change that culture
by emphasizing the importance of shaping the international environ-
ment and preventing conict in the rst place, including through the
development of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) initiative.
4
In fact, the US Army has signicant strategic roles to play in the
Indo-Asia-Pacic region that cannot be adequately performed by naval
or air forces. They fall into three broad categories: bolstering defense of
allies and deterring aggression; promoting regional security and stabil-
ity through security cooperation; and ameliorating the growing United
States–China security dilemma. As discussed below, the United States
1 Jan van Tol , Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, “AirSea Battle: A Point
of Departure Operational Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,” Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), May 18, 2010, www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/
airsea-battle-concept/; T. X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely
Conict,” National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), June 2012, www.ndu.
edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20278%20Hammes.pdf; Jonathan G. Odom, “What Does a ‘Pivot’ or
‘Rebalance’ Look Like? Elements of the U.S. Strategic Turn Towards Security in the Asia-Pacic
Region and Its Waters,” Asian Pacic Law & Policy Journal 14, no. 1 (December 31, 2012).
2 John Nagl, quoted in Julian E. Barnes, “Shrinking Budget Forces Army Into New Battleeld,”
The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2013, p. 1.
3 Jack Midgley, “Building Partner Capability: Dening an Army Role in Future Small Wars,”
Small Wars Journal, February 20, 2012, at smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/building-partner-capability.
4 Ray Odierno, “The Force of Tomorrow,” Foreign Policy, February 4, 2013, www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2013/02/04/the_force_of_tomorrow.
Us LAndpower in regionAL FocUs
Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
John R. Deni
Dr. John R. Deni is a Professor
of Joint, Interagency,
Intergovernmental, and
Multinational Security Studies
at the US Army War College's
Strategic Studies Institute.
He worked for eight years
as a political and legisla-
tive advisor for senior US
commanders and consulted
on national security issues for
the Departments of Defense,
Energy, and State.
