The Rise and Decline of Strategic Paralysis
By
Adam Elkus
Journal Article |
Sep 17 2011 - 5:08am
A distinct backlash against technology in favor of the “human element” is a primary driver of recent
military ideas--with General James Mattis’ stinging 2008 dismissal of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) as
the exemplar. Since then, the rhetoric of new military concepts has embraced social science, a
corresponding focus on the human factors, and reflexive skepticism about technology’s ability to achieve
strategic decision or lift the ever-present “fog of war.” The problem with this narrative is that technology
alone does not explain why the operational concepts that emerged from late 1990s were ineffective. And it
doesn’t point the way towards creating new joint operational concepts in an era that may once again
foreground high-intensity informatized war and put manpower-intensive counterinsurgency on the back
burner.
EBO and related concepts did not fail because they were high-tech or utilized standoff firepower. Rather,
we can better understand their failure through the concepts of annihilation and attrition. Strategic
paralysis, a subset of annihilation, was at the heart of contemporary operational concepts. Joint doctrine
will continue to develop for a future of conflict beyond counterinsurgency. Any future framework for
operational adaptation must incorporate the effects of technological change, while avoiding the seductions
of strategic paralysis theory.
Annihilation and Attrition
First, as an ordering principle it is important to understand two very misunderstood terms,
annihilation
and
attrition
. These terms are often conflated, and attrition is completely misunderstood altogether as a
meaningless attempt to win by sheer dint of numbers. The German historian Hans Delbrück divided
strategy into these two fundamental forms.
[1]
There are other ways of classifying strategy, but
Delbrück’s century-old classification is still often employed for analysis.
Strategies of annihilation use a single set-piece battle or a short lightning campaign to rapidly disarm or
destroy the opponent. Classically, the endpoint occurred when the short and violent employment of force
destroyed the opponent’s forces, leading to the fall of the capitol and the distribution of troops into the
enemy’s heartland. In a modern context, a strategy of annihilation would be a single blow or set of
carefully targeted moves that either paralyze the enemy’s ability to resist or demoralizes them enough to
surrender.
[2]
A strategy of attrition (also known as a strategy of erosion or exhaustion) aims to produce
the impossibility of victory for the opponent by steadily raising the moral and material costs of resistance
until the opponent scales down his goals.
[3]
There are subtle (but important) differences between different types of annihilation and attrition as
employed by different arms of national power in different political and military contexts. But the two
definitions used here are broad enough to be generally employed for the duration of this discussion.
Strategic paralysis theory, the primary subject of discussion, is a subset of annihilation theory developed
