Dumb donkeys or cunning foxes?
Learning in the British and German armies
during the Great War
ROBERT T. FOLEY
*
International Aairs 90: () –
©
The Author(s). International Aairs © The Royal Institute of International Aairs. Published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd, Garsington Road, Oxford , UK and Main Street, Malden, MA , USA.
There are many myths about the First World War. One in particular has been
both enduring and widespread. Almost from the time of the war’s conclusion, the
belief arose that the ocer corps of the combatant armies, and in particular the
higher commanders, were unable to meet the challenges of modern warfare. The
high casualties suered by all armies, combined with almost static warfare, at least
on the Western Front, convinced observers from all sides that military leaders had
been unable to learn from their mistakes. While the common soldier of the war
was cast as a hero/victim, his ocers were castigated as unimaginative dullards or
buoons.
In short, the ‘lions’ of the war had been led by ‘donkeys’.
The immediate shock of the war helps to explain why the image developed in
the interwar period, but it has remained remarkably resilient despite considerable
research generating contrary findings. There is no doubt that portrayals of the war
around the fiftieth anniversary reinforced the image of ‘lions led by donkeys’.
However, even in this period, scholarship demonstrated the remarkable way in
which the armies learned the lessons of recent fighting. Perhaps foremost among
those arguing that armies, the British army in particular, were learning organiza-
tions was John Terraine. In a series of books, he demonstrated how the British
army was able to adapt its tactics and develop new technologies to counter the
challenges of the First World War battlefields.
Terraine’s points were taken up by
*
The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this article are those of the author alone and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Joint Services Command and Sta College, the UK Ministry of
Defence or any other government agency.
On the idea of the victim/hero image of the common soldier, see Helen B. McCartney, ‘Hero, victim or
villain? The public image of the British soldier and its implications for defence policy’, Defence and Security
Analysis : , March , pp. –; and, more particularly, her contribution to this issue of International
Aairs (pp. – below).
The phrase ‘lions led by donkeys’ was supposedly used by German commanders during the war to describe
the British forces. It served as the inspiration for Alan Clark’s influential book, The donkeys (New York:
William Morrow, ). Clark attributes the quotation to an exchange between Erich Ludendor and
Max Homann, quoted in Erich von Falkenhayn’s memoirs, but subsequent research has discredited this
attribution. Nonetheless, it was certainly current in German thinking during the war, as evidenced by Princess
Blücher’s diary entry for April , in which she implies this is Ludendor ’s view. See Evelyn, Princess
Blücher, An English wife in Berlin: a private memoir of events, politics and daily life in Germany throughout the war and
the social revolution of 1918 (London: Constable, ), p. .
For recent examinations of this phenomenon, see Dan Todman, The Great War: myth and memory (London:
Hambledon, ); Stephen Badsey, The British army in battle and its image, 1914–1918 (London: Continuum, ).
John Terraine, Douglas Haig: the educated soldier (London: Hutchinson, ); To win a war: 1918, the year of victory
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, ); White heat: the new warfare, 1914–1918 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, ).
