The Landpower Essay series, published by AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare, is designed to provide an outlet for original essays
on topics that will stimulate professional discussion and further public understanding of the landpower aspects of national
security. The content represents the personal opinions of the author and not necessarily the position of the Association of the
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L
ANDPOWER
E
SSAY
No. 01-1 March 2001
The Center of Gravity Fad:
Consequence of the Absence of an Overarching American Theory of War
by
Colonel Gordon M. Wells, USA
Introduction
We Americans love our fads. As children we all have at least some memories of various fads that
have come and gone: hula hoops, skateboards, tie-dyed jeans, pet rocks. Yet, our predilection toward
fads is not limited to our purchases at the toy store. As we grow older, fads take on greater
sophistication, such as joining the office rush to buy the latest Pentium computer or drink the newest
microbrew beer.
Having attended several military schools in recent years, from Fort Leavenworth to Norfolk to
Carlisle, I have observed a fad among students and graduates of these institutions: the tendency to
define “center of gravity” as being everything from the military to national will to logistics to you-
name-it. It has almost become stylish to see who can come up a unique center of gravity for a given
scenario. In fairness to all of us who have engaged in such discussions, the modern seeds of this
doctrinal cacophony were initially planted in the Army’s capstone manual, Field Manual (FM) 100-5,
Operations, and later developed roots in the joint doctrinal capstone manual, Joint Publication 3-0,
Doctrine for Joint Operations.
FM 100-5 defines the center of gravity as “the hub of all power and movement upon which
everything depends.” Unfortunately, the doctrine writers added this statement: “Several traditional
examples of a potential center of gravity include the mass of the enemy army, the enemy’s battle
command structure, public opinion, national will, and an alliance or coalition structure.” Although
Joint Pub 3-0 provides a better discussion of center of gravity, it too potentially muddies the water
when it states, “[A]t the strategic level, centers of gravity might include . . . an alliance, national will
or public support.”
The lack of a universally understood definition of center of gravity is only the tip of the iceberg.
In reality, our current “center of gravity fad” is symptomatic of a larger problem: the absence of a
joint, universally accepted theory of war. We continue to rely heavily on land warfare theorists such
