The Security Dilemma as a Social Process
Jason M.K. Lyall
Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs
Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School
Princeton University
jlyall@princeton.edu
January 2006
Word Count: 13,979
Abstract. Existing accounts of the security
dilemma largely overlook its transformative effects
on actor properties. This article argues that the security dilemma should be recast as a social
process in which states become socialized into realpolitik behavior. Repeated interactions can
shift collective identity (actor type) by (1) revising a regime’s understanding of the “game” being
played, (2) its expectations about its role and the rules of the game, and (3) the strategies deemed
appropriate for that particular game. Security dilemmas can therefore create revisionists out of
status quo actors, an evolution neglected in current theories. As an initial test, the article examines
Russia’s response to the introduction of American forces to Central Asia after 11 September. At
once welcoming and fearing American power, Russia’s response allows us to capture a nascent
security dilemma as it unfolds. Quantitative computer-assisted textual analysis (CATA) is used to
measure shifts in Russian identity in a random sample of official speeches from January 2000-
September 2004 (N=456, or 740,000+ words).
Author’s Note: I thank Valerie Bunce, Tom Christensen, Wolfga
ng Danspeckgruber, Chris
tina
Davis, Matthew Evangelista, Alexander Golts, Ted Hopf, Pet
er Katzenstein, Todd Lowery,
Alexander Montgomery, Kris Ramsay, Gilbert Rozman, Anne Sartori and Christopher Way for
helpful comments on and conversations about earlier versions of this paper. My thanks also to
Anna Likhtenshtein, Milanna Streltsina, and Anna Tolkachova for conducting the intercoder
reliability tests.
