Waging Communication War
KENNETH PAYNE
© 2008 Kenneth Payne
I
n Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is fighting wars in which the ef
-
fective communication of ideas and information is vital. Strategists in both
these conflicts increasingly share with classic counterinsurgency theorists a
keen appreciation that they are fighting for the support of the population, and
that communication is a key part of the struggle.
This article sets out to explore the ramifications of this feature of
modern war. Communications may be vital, but how should the operational
and tactical commander use them to best advantage? Why have US military
and civilian authorities found effective communication so difficult in the cur
-
rent struggle against militant Islamism?
The US military has now formally incorporated what might be
called communication war into doctrine, both in its dedicated counterinsur-
gency field manual and in its newly updated operational field manual, corner-
stone of overall doctrine.
1
Both manuals go into some detail about the
importance of communication and related concepts, such as the media, public
affairs, psychological operations, and information operations. While the
manuals offer compelling advice on what should be achieved in the informa-
tion domain, guidance on how to achieve it is somewhat lacking. This distinc-
tion reflects the complexity of communication in warfare, particularly in
wars involving irregular forces engaged in insurgency. Many actors and vari-
ables are involved, and few of them are under the direct control of those in the
operational chain of command.
Consider some of the factors: The strategic direction, which greatly
influences popular attitudes toward conflict, is formed largely in the political
stratosphere of Washington, and partly in conjunction with allied govern-
ments. Politically savvy senior leaders can certainly influence the direction
of this strategy, but there are also other powerful actors involved. Likewise,
Summer 2008 37
