Introduction
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) “directs the Department [of Defense] to
act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) as the pacing challenge for the Department.”
1
However, slashes to Army endstrength,
topline additions favoring other services and a attening budget for the nation’s land force
suggest that the importance of landpower in the Indo-Pacic remains undervalued and mis-
understood. Unlike in Europe or in the Middle East, communicating
the value of the Army in the Indo-Pacic—the priority theater—
faces headwinds from skeptical majorities, both from inside and out-
side of DoD, who are unaware of the role that land forces perform in
a theater long considered, according to one prominent historian, “a
special preserve of the navy.”
2
However, joint and combined mili-
tary operations in the Indo-Pacic, including large-scale protracted
conicts across air, land and sea, have in fact relied on the Army’s
foundational capabilities for well over a century.
Without question, deterring the PRC requires more advanced
naval and air assets than we currently have, plus a modernized nu-
clear arsenal and cutting-edge space and cyber capabilities. But
implementing the 2022 NDS, or operationalizing its strategy, fun-
damentally depends on methods that, rst, fuse the eorts of the
U.S. military services, which all characteristically shy away from
jointness; and, second, bind the loose mix of allies and partners in
the region, all of whom demonstrate varying levels of commitment.
Combatant commanders provide the operational direction and command and control (C2),
but they depend on the services (represented by service component commands like U.S.
Army Pacic) to practically integrate their means through ways that achieve unity of eort.
The Army has performed and continues to perform this vital role as a practical integrator to
achieve unity of eort among joint and multinational forces, which underscores how imple-
menting the NDS in the Indo-Pacic—as unlikely as it may sound—hinges on landpower.
Overcoming Obstacles
Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth has labeled the Army as the “linchpin ser-
vice” and the “backbone of joint operations” to emphasize the Army’s various combat and
support roles in the region.
3
But unlike other theaters, the Army faces two persistent chal-
lenges when communicating its universal value in the Indo-Pacic as a practical integrator
of joint and multilateral assets and eorts to deter the PRC.
First, solutions to military problems in the region tend to discount the role of landpower
by predominantly focusing on naval and air capabilities.
4
However, the Indo-Pacic area of
Implementing the
Strategy to Deter China
Hinges on Landpower
LANDPOWER ESSAY NO. 23-3
MAY 2023
by General Charles A. Flynn, U.S. Army, and Major Tim Devine, U.S. Army
More advanced military
capabilities, particularly in the
air and maritime domains,
are essential to deterring
the People’s Republic of
China, but implementing or
operationalizing the National
Defense Strategy in the Indo-
Pacific fundamentally requires
landpower to practically
integrate joint and combined
military operations.
1
