Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory.
Part I (Chapters 1–7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of
preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of
the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8–14) introduces the concept
of equilibrium, beginning, unconven� onally, with the models of the jungle and an economy
with indivisible goods, and con� nuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium
with ra� onal expecta� ons, and an economy with asymmetric informa� on. Part III (Chapters
15–16) provides an introduc� on to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games
and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters
17–20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axioma� c analysis of
economic systems, and social choice.
The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results
precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathema� cs (with
almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It
includes about 150 exercises.
With its formal but accessible style, this textbook is designed for undergraduate students of
microeconomics at intermediate and advanced levels.
As with all Open Book publica� ons, this en� re book is available to read for free on the
publisher’s website. Printed and digital edi� ons, together with supplementary digital
material, can also be found at www.openbookpublishers.com
Cover design by Mar� n J. Osborne
Models in
Microeconomic Theory
Martin J. Osborne
Ariel Rubinstein
OBP
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